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Abstract—The recent advancements in hardware miniaturiza-
tion capabilities have boosted the diffusion of systems based
on Energy Harvesting (EH) technologies, as a means to power
embedded wireless devices in a sustainable and low-cost fashion.
Despite the undeniable management advantages, the intermittent
availability of the energy source and the limited power supply
has led to challenging system trade-offs, resulting in an increased
attack surface and a general relaxation of the available security
services.
In this paper, we survey the security issues, applications, tech-
niques, and challenges arising in wireless networks powered via
EH technologies. We explore the vulnerabilities of EH networks,
and we provide a comprehensive overview of the scientific litera-
ture, including attack vectors, cryptography techniques, physical-
layer security schemes for data secrecy, and additional physical-
layer countermeasures. For each of the identified macro-areas,
we compare the scientific contributions across a range of shared
features, indicating the pros and cons of the described techniques,
the research challenges, and a few future directions. Finally, we
also provide an overview of the emerging topics in the area, such
as Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access (NOMA) and Rate-Splitting
Multiple Access (RSMA) schemes, and Intelligent Reconfigurable
Surfaces, that could trigger the interest of industry and academia
and unleash the full potential of pervasive EH wireless networks.
Index Terms—Energy Harvesting Security; Green Com-
munications Security; IoT Security; Physical-Layer Security;
Lightweight Cryptography.
I. INTRODUCTION
Next-generation wireless networks are increasingly evolv-
ing toward pervasive and ubiquitous systems, able to bring
new capabilities in a variety of environments and application
scenarios [1]. This paradigm evolution has been enabled in
the late 1990s thanks to the rise of Wireless Sensor Networks
(WSNs), and it has progressed to a large scale thanks to the
evolution of Internet of Things (IoT), Cyber-Physical Systems
(CPS), and, more recently, 5G networks [2].
Despite the massive growth and the increasing computa-
tional capabilities of tiny wireless devices, energy availability
and consumption still remain critical issues [3]. Indeed, while
improvements in hardware embedding capabilities widened the
computing efficiency and potential applications of wireless
devices, the energy budget required to power the devices
increases accordingly, severely affecting the lifetime and avail-
ability of the associated wireless networks. At the same time,
increasing the capacity of batteries on-board of these devices is
only a time-limited solution, further postponing the issue and
impacting on the form-factor and ubiquity of the devices [4].
These issues motivated the recent exponential growth of
the Energy Harvesting (EH) research area. Several solutions,
such as solar, thermoelectric, and mechanical harvesting tech-
niques, have been re-introduced and improved in their size
and features to be suitable to power embedded devices, in
a tentative to move toward perpetual battery-free pervasive
communications [5]. At the same time, the theoretical studies
describing the usage of existing or dedicated Radio Frequency
(RF) transmissions to power embedded devices have finally
translated into real devices and hit the market, thanks to
dedicated prototypes and commercial products building on
RF power harvesting to provide energy to embedded devices
[6]. The potentials of EH for the next-generation low-power
wireless networks are confirmed by several projects, funded by
the most important funding agencies throughout the world. For
instance, the EU funded several projects related to EH under
the Horizon 2020 (H2020) research and innovation program,
including Tryst Energy [7], DuraCap [8], EnABLES [9], Plug-
N-Harvest [10], and Re-Vibe [11], to name a few. The US
National Science Foundation also funded several pilot studies,
such as CORE [12], SMALL [13], and CAREER [14]. In
addition, the National Science Foundation of China is also
supporting several scientific contributions focusing on the
development of EH technologies, such as [15], [16], and [17].
This is finally confirmed also by recent pilot studies, in-
dicating EH techniques such as ambient backscatter and RF
energy harvesting as crucial enabling technologies for sixth
generation (6G) wireless networks [18], [19], [20].
Despite their appealing features and significant advantages,
the switch to EH sources generally widens the attack surface
of wireless networks and cyber-physical systems. On the one
hand, powering embedded devices via intermittent energy
sources and, in the case of wireless powering, removing wired
power connections, expose the devices to inexpensive and easy
eavesdropping attacks [21], [22], [23]. On the other hand, the
shift to EH power sources exacerbates the well-known trade-
off between energy and security, further decreasing the energy
budget available for security operations [24]. Considering
the traditional low awareness of security vulnerabilities by
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Fig. 1. Taxonomy and classification of the scientific contributions in this survey. We identified four macro-areas related to security issues in EH networks,
being them dedicated to the investigation of attacks, physical-layer data secrecy issues, lightweight cryptography approaches, and additional physical-layer
countermeasures. Within each area, we further identify distinguishing adversarial models and specific design trends. Finally, for each of the investigated topics,
we identify crucial research challenges and future directions .
wireless network administrators (for the sake of immediate
services availability), the reduction of the energy budget often
brings to the reduction of security barriers [25].
Security issues in EH networks have been quickly touched
by few position papers and surveys available in the literature.
An overview of their main features and differences with this
contribution is provided in Tab. I.
Several pioneering contributions, such as [26], [27], [22],
and [28], preliminarily identified the main attacks and security
issues affecting RF EH networks, inspiring a relevant literature
production over the last years. However, besides considering
only a limited set of weaknesses in wireless-powered EH
networks, the cited contributions did not provide any overview
of possible defense schemes and countermeasures. Similarly,
the position paper by the authors in [30] described the usage
of cooperative strategies in wireless-powered EH networks,
highlighting their benefits also from the security perspective.
However, the cited paper did not consider the literature in
the security domain, and security issues were not addressed,
too. Looking at the main surveys available in the literature,
valuable contributions are provided by the authors in [21],
[29], [32], and [34]. However, they focused either on the
description of the main aspects and challenges of RF EH
technologies (such as [21]), or on specific techniques and
phenomena, such as interference [29], beamforming [32],
and Simultaneous Wireless Information and Power Transfer
(SWIPT) technologies [34]. We also report the recent survey
by the authors in [36] on physical-layer security, where a
few physical-layer security approaches based on EH concepts
are mentioned, without any further detail. Finally, the recent
study by the authors in [33] only provides an overview of the
techniques used to improve physical layer security in SWIPT
networks. However, the main attacks, defensive technolo-
gies, network availability considerations, countermeasures, and
research challenges related to the security domain are not
discussed. In addition, we notice that none of the surveys and
position papers currently available in the literature widens the
analysis, practically excluding other EH sources, such as solar,
wind, mechanical, and thermoelectric sources that, instead, we
take into full consideration in this survey. Further, the cited
contributions also did not consider all the works that adapted
cryptography approaches to work efficiently on EH nodes.
Therefore, we remark that the literature is actually missing a
comprehensive survey specifically conceived to tackle all the
security aspects connected to the operation of EH networks,
including information secrecy at the physical layer, cryptog-
raphy techniques, attacks, additional physical-layer defensive
technologies, and, finally, network availability considerations.
Contribution. In this paper, we close the above-introduced
3TABLE I
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE TOPICS TACKLED IN THIS PAPER AND THE RELATED SURVEYS TOUCHING NETWORK SECURITY ISSUES IN EH NETWORKS.
Ref. RF
Sources
Solar
Sources
Mechanical
Sources
Wind
Sources
Thermoelectric
Sources
Cryptography
Approaches
Additional
PHY-layer
counter-
measures
Research
Challenges
[26] X 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
[27] X 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
[22] X 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
[28] X 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
[29] X 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
[30] X 5 5 5 5 5 5 X
[31] X 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
[21] X 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
[32] X 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
[33] X 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
[34] X 5 5 5 5 5 5 X
[35] X 5 5 5 5 5 X X
[36] X 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
This
survey
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
gap by providing a comprehensive survey on security issues,
applications, approaches, and research challenges character-
izing wireless networks and embedded systems powered via
Energy Harvesting sources. Building on the existing litera-
ture, we first describe the threats and vulnerabilities affecting
wireless networks operating thanks to EH sources. Next, we
survey the security schemes related to EH networks available
in the literature, classifying them across reference macro-
areas, such as physical-layer approaches for data secrecy,
lightweight cryptography techniques, and additional physical-
layer countermeasures. For each of these macro-categories, as
a novel contribution, we describe the adversarial models, the
assumptions, the solutions, and we cross-compare the scientific
works available in the literature via their distinctive features
(see Figure 1 for a high-level overview).
Finally, we provide future research directions along the
above-described macro-areas, as well as, some additional
crucial research challenges, whose further investigation could
unleash the full potential of EH technologies, toward the large-
scale adoption of EH sources in wireless networks.
We remark that this paper is not yet another survey on
physical-layer security. Indeed, in this paper we survey se-
curity issues, approaches, and applications strictly connected
to all EH networks (not only RF), where dedicated RF and
natural energy sources are used to enable Device-to-Device
Communications (D2D) communications in IoT and generic
wireless networks. These networks include embedded systems
powered via solar, mechanical, wind, and electromagnetic
sources, such as ambient backscatter, Wireless Powered Com-
munication Network, SWIPT networks, to name a few. There-
fore, technologies such as Radio Frequency IDentification
(RFID), Near Field Communication (NFC), and traditional
tag-to-reader backscatter networks are not within the scope
of this survey, as these communication schemes can neither
power embedded systems, nor detect transmissions of other
nearby devices, nor power D2D networks, but they can com-
municate exclusively to compatible devices (e.g. RFID and
NFC readers) [37] —the interested readers can refer to [38]
and [39] for a comprehensive survey on the security issues
related to the cited technologies.
Roadmap. The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II provides an overview of the technologies enabling
energy harvested embedded systems; then, Section III de-
scribes the threats and vulnerabilities intrinsic to the operation
of EH networks, motivating the study of several security
schemes in the areas. The application and customization
of cryptography schemes in EH networks is discussed in
Section IV. Then, the mechanisms and strategies deployed
to enhance physical-layer data secrecy are described in Sec-
tion V. Additional physical-layer countermeasures deployed to
face the afore-mentioned attacks are described in Section VI.
Emerging research areas and future research directions are
described in Section VII and, finally, Section VIII tightens
conclusions.
II. OVERVIEW OF ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES
In this section, we introduce the enabling technologies
considered in this work, as well as some important back-
ground concepts that have been introduced in the literature
when dealing with security in EH networks. Specifically,
Section II-A reports some basic notions on energy harvest-
ing technologies using non-RF sources, such as solar-based
sources, mechanical sources, and thermoelectric generators,
while RF harvesting methods are introduced in Section II-B.
Preliminary details regarding Ambient Backscatter Commu-
nication Network (ABCN) are introduced in Section II-C,
while Section II-D focuses on the principles enabling Wireless
Powered Communication Networks. Section II-E provides an
overview of the logic and hardware architectures adopted in
SWIPT networks. Finally, few distinctive features of EH net-
works crucial for the design of security solutions are discussed
in Section II-F. We highlight that the aim of this section is to
let the reader familiarize with harvesting technologies and their
main features, with reference to security issues. For exhaustive
discussion on the main hardware considerations behind EH
technologies, we refer the reader to dedicated books, such
as [40].
4A. Energy Harvesting via non-RF Sources
Energy Harvesting (EH) processes refer to the set of tech-
niques used to capture electrical energy from ambient sources,
thanks to dedicated conversion circuits, to be used to extend
the lifetime of battery-powered wireless devices [40], [41].
EH capabilities are appealing for a variety of applica-
tions, especially the ones involving pervasive devices, such
as Wireless Body Area Networks (WBANs), WSNs, and IoT.
Indeed, from the networking perspective, one of the main
challenges of these applications domains has been always
the limited energy availability provided by on-board batteries,
as well as the high maintenance costs deriving by batteries
replacement operations. On the one hand, EH capabilities
can provide additional energy availability for battery-powered
devices, enabling enhanced services (e.g., higher throughput,
increased devices availability). On the other hand, EH circuits
could replace batteries, possibly reducing operational costs, the
form factor of the devices, and their impact on the surrounding
context.
Several environmental or non-dedicated sources can be used
to scavenge energy and to power embedded circuits, enabling
wireless networks [42], [43]. An overview of the main features
of these sources is provided below, while a summary of the
harvesting capabilities of the several sources is provided in
Table II.
TABLE II
OVERVIEW OF ENERGY HARVESTING SOURCES AND RELATED POWER
DENSITIES.
EH Source Type Power Density Ref.
Solar [0.006− 15] mW/cm2 [44]
Wind [0.065− 28.5] mW/cm2 [45], [46]
Mechanical -
Piezoelectric
[0.11− 7.31] mW ·g2/cm3 [40]
Thermoelectric [15− 60] µW/cm3 [44]
RF
[
1.2 · 10−5 − 15] mW/cm2 [44], [47]
Solar Sources. Historically, solar-to-DC conversion tech-
niques have been the most investigated ones in the research
community. The devices powered through solar energy use
solar panels to convert light into energy. Due to the inter-
mittent presence of the solar source (e.g., due to the adverse
weather conditions or during darkness periods), rechargeable
batteries and capacitors are used to store the excess energy
and to guarantee continuous energy availability. We refer the
interested readers to the valuable contribution in [48] for
an overview of the most important challenges and hardware
design considerations about solar-powered embedded systems.
Generally speaking, the latest scientific sources available in
the literature show that solar cells for embedded systems can
achieve a power density in the range [0.006− 15] mW/cm2
per time unit, depending on the luminosity level [44].
Mechanical Sources. Natural mechanical vibrations are
among the most popular and attractive sources for energy
harvesting. Indeed, mechanical vibrations generated from nat-
ural events (such as seismic motion and water tides) pro-
duce kinetic energy, characterized by a power density that
is significant enough to power embedded devices [40]. The
systems leveraging mechanical sources for energy harvesting
are usually classified based on the physical principle used
to transduce from kinetic to electrical energy, and they can
be partitioned into piezoelectric, electromagnetic, and electro-
static systems. Piezoelectric systems work according to the
piezoelectric effect first described by Marie Curie in 1880,
by using the electric charge produced within a material as
a consequence of a mechanical stress [49]. These systems
often use dedicated materials, such as the zinc oxide and
polymer-based materials, that are well-known to be charac-
terized by relevant electromagnetic coupling. Electromagnetic
harvesters leverage the electromagnetic induction principle, by
generating voltage as a result of the variation of the magnetic
field. Compared to piezoelectric-based systems, they are more
difficult to integrate with modern Micro-Electrical Mechanical
Systems (MEMS), but in medium-size products, they exhibit
a suitable behavior, especially for low-frequency applications.
Conversely, electrostatic harvesters are particularly suitable
for IoT sensors. This latter class of harvesters leverages the
variable capacitance principle, generating different voltages
by changing the capacitance of the system. This is usually
achieved by oscillating a mass attached to a plate, thus varying
the distance of this element from another plate. This class of
harvesters is particularly suitable for embedded integration.
However, these systems usually require an external voltage
source, necessary to charge the plates, and they generate a
limited amount of power.
Without loss of generality, mechanical EH systems generate
power proportionally to the weight of the harvester (e.g.,
the mass in electrostatic harvesters) [50]. Therefore, when
integrated with wireless devices, on the one hand the mass of
the harvester should be maximized while, on the other hand,
satisfying the specific constraints on the size of the system.
Given that the production of the energy can be disjoint from its
usage, the energy scavenged from mechanical sources is typ-
ically stored in rechargeable batteries, exhibiting slower dis-
charge processes than capacitors. Several applications and even
commercial products using a mechanical source for EH are
available on the market [51]. The hardware details regarding
mechanical energy harvesting can be found in [40]. The same
source indicates that piezoelectric EH systems generate a nor-
malized power density in the range [0.117.31] mW ·g2/cm3,
while recent works such as [43] report values of 184 µW/cm3
at 10 Hz for electrostatic harvesters and 0.21 µW/cm3 at
12 Hz for electrostatic harvesters. These values have been also
reported in the updated Table II.
Wind Sources. Similarly to the renewable energy sources
previously discussed, wind sources for EH have been widely
investigated in the literature. These systems use wind micro-
turbines as the mechanical source enabling movement and,
thus, AC generation. More in detail, the movement of the
magnets on the stator of the micro-turbine generate AC elec-
tricity, that is then converted into DC using a bridge rectifier.
However, compared to solar and additional mechanical EH
sources, wind EH systems often require bulky equipment, very
hard to be integrated with embedded devices. In addition,
the wind power source is generally more unreliable than the
other ones, as wind phenomena are more intermittent and
time-varying. More details on hardware-related trade-offs and
5integration can be found in [46]. The same source indicates
that wind micro-turbines suitable for embedded systems can
achieve a power density in the range [0.065− 28.5]mW/cm2
per time unit, assuming a wind speed of 6.3m/s and a turbine
with a length of 30cm. Overall, we notice that the power
density of wind EH sources depends strictly on (i) the wind
intensity, (ii) the air density, (iii) the wind speed, and (iv) the
length of the turbine rotor blade [46].
Thermoelectric Sources. These sources have been his-
torically used mainly in the first space and terrestrial ap-
plications of EH, and they are recently expanding also in
other contexts, such as underwater [52]. Overall, systems
using EH via thermo-electric sources leverage the temperature
difference between two poles to generate energy. Recently,
their usage has been proposed also for embedded devices,
especially for WBANs and micro-structured devices, thanks to
the frequent temperature difference involved in such scenarios.
Overall, thermoelectric power harvesters are considered more
reliable and long-lasting than other EH sources, especially the
mechanical ones, because of the relatively reduced exposition
to movements and mechanical shocks. The hardware consid-
erations regarding thermoelectric generators can be found in
the contributions by the authors in [53]. The latest scientific
sources available in the literature indicate that thermoelectric
harvesters used with embedded systems can reach a power
density level in the range [15− 60] µW/cm3 per time unit,
depending on the specific thermoelectric source [46].
We highlight that all the above-described sources leverage
green sources, i.e., natural phenomena not requiring any pre-
existing system deployment. This is different from RF harvest-
ing, where existing network infrastructure is adopted. Wireless
charging methods are described in the following section.
B. Energy Harvesting via RF Sources
The energy to power an embedded system can be obtained
also via electromagnetic power transfer. This is the most
promising and attractive technology for embedded devices, as
the power generation process takes place via wireless links,
without any physical connection between the energy source
and the powered device. More in detail, embedded devices
powered via electro-magnetic sources use dedicated circuits,
able to extract power from the surrounding electromagnetic
field, thanks to inductive, capacitive, and magneto-dynamic
coupling principles. We refer the interested readers to the
contributions by the authors in [54] for an overview of the
hardware principles driving electromagnetic energy harvesting.
The latest scientific sources available in the literature indicate
that RF signals used to power embedded devices can achieve
a power density in the range
[
1.2 · 10−5 − 15] mW/cm2 per
time unit, depending on factors such as the distance from the
RF source and the peak power of the signal [44], [47].
Overall, three main electromagnetic wireless powered net-
work architectures can be identified: (i) Ambient Backscatter
Communication Networks (ABCN); (ii) Wireless Powered
Communication Networks (WPCN); and, (iii) Simultaneous
Wireless Information and Power Transfers (SWIPT). The
architectures and networking considerations crucial for the
description of security issues and services connected to these
technologies are described in sections II-C, II-D, and II-E,
respectively.
C. Ambient Backscatter Communication Networks (ABCN)
The devices resorting to ambient backscatter for power
supply rely on RF signals already available in the environment
to gain energy. These RF sources include WiFi, Cellular,
Radio, and TV Broadcast, i.e., signals that are used for tasks
other than the specific power supply of the device. From the
hardware perspective, dedicated antennas are used to convert
such signals in a small portion of power (typically in the
order of µWatts), used to reflect the signal with encoded data.
In turn, other ABCN devices in the network use the same
principle to reply and enable D2D communications [55].
Let us assume a generic ABCN network, as the one repre-
sented in Figure 2, where a generic RF source is used as the
ambient RF signal powering K ABCN Transmitters to deliver
information to a single ABCN Receiver.
…
ABCN 
Transmitters
ABCN 
Receiver
RF Source hK
h2
h1
hr
1
2
K
g1
gK
…
g2
Fig. 2. System Model of a generic Ambient Backscatter Communication
Network.
Denoting with hk the channel between the RF source and
the k−th ABCN transmitter, and with gk the channel between
the k − th ABCN transmitter and the ABCN receiver, the
signal y(n) related to the nth bit of the message received by
the ABCN receiver can be modeled as in the following Eq. 1,
as the sum of the direct component from the RF source and
the reflections from the K ABCN transmitters.
y(n) = hr · s(n) +
K∑
k=1
hk · gk · ηk · sk(n) + e(n), (1)
where sk(n) denotes the complex baseband signal origi-
nated by the k− th ABCN transmitter, e(n) is channel noise,
modeled as Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN), and,
finally, ηk is the backscatter efficiency factor, being η ∈ [0, 1],
indicating the backscatter efficiency of the k− th transmitter.
D. Wireless Powered Communication Networks
Wireless Powered Communication Networks (WPCN), of-
ten referred to as Far-Field Wireless Power Transfer (WPT)
networks, are communication networks enabled through the
presence of dedicated power sources, providing the necessary
6energy to power the devices via the WPT technology. An
exemplary system model is depicted in Figure 3, where a
power beacon transmits a dedicated RF signal that is used by
the source to accumulate the necessary energy to communicate
with multiple destination devices.
Power Beacon
Source Destinations
…
Fig. 3. System Model of a generic Wireless Powered Communication
Network. The power beacon emits RF source that powers the transmitter and
enable it to communicate with a receiver.
Compared to backscatter communication networks, WPCNs
use dedicated signals (not used for other communication
tasks), characterized by larger communication ranges, thanks
to larger transmitting antennas compared to the radiation
wavelength [21].
Compared to SWIPT working according to the Time Split-
ting (TS) architecture (see Section II-E), instead, the main
difference lies in the fact that the harvested energy is used
to enable the transmission of information rather than the re-
charge of the devices, thus anticipating the communication
phase (this communication paradigm is often referred as
harvest-then-transmit). Moreover, the signal that powers the
devices is decoupled from the information signal, as it is not
specifically meant to transfer information.
Assuming that τ0 is the amount of time dedicated to
energy harvesting in a block duration of time T , such energy
harvesting time should be optimized to trade-off between
the power available at the device and the data rate, being
these metrics directly related to the Signal to Noise plus
Interference Ratio (SINR) at the destination and thus to the
secrecy capacity of the communication link (see Sec. II-E).
Moreover, severe security issues at the physical layer arise
especially for devices located far from the power source, that
can harvest less energy than the others but require more power
to push the transmission farther.
We refer the interested readers to the valuable contribution
by the authors in [56] for more details about the networking
issues characterizing WPCNs, while security-related scientific
contributions will be investigated in Sec. V.
E. SWIPT
As shown in Figure 4, Simultaneous Wireless Information
and Power Transfer (SWIPT) networks are characterized by
contextual EH and information transfer processes, via dedi-
cated hardware architectures.
Source
Destinations
…
RF Energy + Information
Fig. 4. System Model of a generic Single-Input Multiple-Output Simultaneous
Wireless Information and Power Transfer network. A battery-powered source
emits a signal transferring information and RF energy, at the same time.
Generally speaking, SWIPT systems are characterized by
an emitting power station and several N (N > 1) of desti-
nation nodes. For the sake of simplicity, in the following, we
introduce the notation for the case of a Single-Input Multiple-
Output (SIMO) system, where the multiple receiving entities
are equipped each with a single antenna, while the extension
for multiple-antenna systems is straightforward.
The complex baseband signal transmitted by the source,
namely x, is given by the linear combination of the symbols
emitted by the transmitting antennas to the receivers, as in the
following Eq. 2.
x =
N∑
n=1
wn · sn, (2)
where wn are the weights that are modulated by the
transmitting antenna to the signal sn for the nth receiver,
generally referred to as a beamforming vector.
The complex signal available at the generic nth receiving
antenna, denoted as yn, depends on both the transmitted
signal x and the distortion introduced by the wireless channel,
modeled by the matrix hn. Without loss of generality, the
following Eq. 3 holds:
yn = hn
H · x+ en, (3)
where the H exponent denotes the Hermitian transformation
of the matrix hn (i.e., the transpose and conjugate of the
matrix), while en is a noise component at the nth receiving
antenna, modeling undesired channel effects as AWGN with
variance σ2n. In addition, hn is the distortion caused by the
wireless channel, and it is frequently modeled according to
a circularly symmetric complex normal distribution, having
zero mean and noise covariance matrix, i.e., S, namely e ∼
CN (0,S). In most of the works analyzed in this paper, the
covariance matrix is statistically modeled according to the flat-
fading Rayleigh model, while the Nakagami-m model is used
when aerial links are involved [57].
The following manipulation of the signal at the receiver
depends on the hardware architecture assumed for the re-
ceiving device. The literature mainly considers four hardware
architectures: Time Switching (TS), Power Switching (PS),
7Separate Receivers (SR), and Antenna Switching (AS). The
first three architectures are discussed in the following subsec-
tions, while we neglect the logic of the AS architecture given
that none of the scientific contributions studied in this paper
investigated this configuration (the interested readers can refer
to the description in [58] for more details).
1) Time Switching (TS) Receiver Architecture: Time-
Switching (TS) EH receivers split the time duration of a time
block T in two distinct non-overlapping phases, lasting αnT
and (1− αn)T , where αn is referred as the time-switching
parameter. In the first period, namely Information Decoding
(ID) Phase, lasting αT , the receiver decodes information; then,
in the remaining part of the time block, namely the Energy
Harvesting Phase, it uses the signal to harvest energy and
charge the device. It is worth noting that, differently from
the logic of a Wireless Powered Communication Network
(WPCN), the energy harvesting phase follows the information
decoding phase.
The signal available for ID at the receiver, namely yI , can be
expressed as in the following Eq. 4, where the signals emitted
by the source toward other users are considered as interfering
transmissions.
yI =
N∑
n=1
hn
H · x =
= hn
H ·wn · sn + hnH ·
∑
j 6=n
wj · sj + en.
(4)
Thus, the SINR for the nth user can be expressed as in the
following Eq. 5.
SINRn =
|hnH ·wn|2∑
j 6=n |hnH ·wj|2 + σ2n
. (5)
The SINR can be used to obtain the capacity of the channel
for each user, i.e., the maximum rate of information available
at the user. According to the Shannon Theorem on channel
capacity, it is defined as in the following Eq. 6.
Cn = αn log2(1 + SINRn), n ∈ N. (6)
2) Power Switching (PS) Receiver Architecture: When the
receiver works according to the Power Switching (PS) hard-
ware architecture, the information decoding phase and the
energy harvesting phase take place at the same time. This
is achieved thanks to dedicated circuit design, splitting the
received power signal in a part used for information decoding
and another part used for EH, according to a power splitting
factor, namely ρn. As for the TS architecture, the information
signal available at the receiver can be modeled as depicted in
Eq. 7.
yI =
√
ρn
(
N∑
n=1
hn
H · x
)
+ qn =
=
√
ρn
hnH ·wn · sn + hnH ·∑
j 6=n
wj · sj + en
+ qn,
(7)
where qn models an additional AWGN due to the non-
idealities introduced by RF-to-DC conversion circuits, having
variance δ2n. From the above expression, it is possible to obtain
the SINR and the channel capacity for the generic user n, as
in the following Eq. 8 and Eq. 9, respectively.
SINRn =
ρn|hnH ·wn|2
ρn
∑
j 6=n |hjH ·wj|2 + ρnδ2n + σ2n
. (8)
Cn = log2(1 + SINRn), n ∈ N. (9)
3) Separated Receiver (SR) Architecture: While TS and PS
are different hardware architectures, the Separated Receivers
(RC) is a scenario where some receivers are specifically ded-
icated to EH activities, while others are specifically dedicated
to communication tasks. Defining A the set of users dedicated
to communication tasks and B the ones dedicated to EH (with
|A| + |B| = N ), the signal transmitted by the source can be
modeled as in the following Eq. 10:
x =
∑
n∈A
wn · sn +
∑
m∈B
wm · sm, (10)
where sn and sm are the information signal and the energy
signal, respectively. Considering the generic nth user selected
for information decoding, the signal received at this user is
expressed by the following Eq. 11.
yIn =
N∑
n=1
hn
H · x =
=
∑
n∈A
hn
Hwnsn +
∑
m∈B
hm
Hwmsm + en =
= hn
Hwnsn +
∑
j∈A,j 6=n
hj
Hwjsj +
∑
m∈B
hm
Hwmsm + en.
(11)
As in the previous hardware designs, the information signal
can be used to derive the SINR and the channel capacity for the
scenario, as in the following Eq. 12 and Eq. 13, respectively.
SINRn =
|hnH ·wn|2∑
j∈A,j 6=n |hjH ·wj|2 +
∑
m∈B |hmH ·wm|2 + σ2n
,
(12)
Cn = log2(1 + SINRn), n ∈ A. (13)
F. Unique Features in EH Networks
Without loss of generality, we can notice that embedded
devices powered via EH technologies exhibit unique energy
availability features, severely influencing, in turn, the design
of security solutions.
Overall, two main features can be highlighted. First, the
availability of the specific source used to generate power
supply is both intermittent and out-of-scale for embedded
devices, as qualitatively shown in the following Figure 5.
The overall energy available for the re-charging is generally
characterized by periods of high availability, alternated with
periods of low/no availability. During the full availability
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Fig. 5. Qualitative description of the EH process. When high energy is
available, the EH circuits power the capacitors on embedded devices, up to
a maximum level of EMAX . When the energy source is not available, the
energy is quickly drained.
periods, the EH circuits can harvest energy up to a maximum
level, (indicated as EMAX in the Figure 5), while the remain-
ing energy cannot be harvested. When the availability of the
external source decreases, the capacitors or batteries on-board
of the embedded system usually start losing energy after a
little time, quickly exhausting the energy resource based on
the current drain of the load system.
In addition, the level of the energy harvested by the em-
bedded system is usually strictly connected with the received
level on the re-charging equipment. The higher the impact of
the energy source on the EH circuit, the higher the energy
recycled, and the higher the energy available for the system.
Especially when considering electromagnetic EH, the received
energy source level could have a severe impact on the overall
harvested energy per time unit, and thus on its availability
for the embedded device. These considerations have motivated
several scientific contributions, such as [59] and [60], that
provided energy consumption models suitable for specific
application scenarios involving EH, such as aircraft and WSN
applications, respectively.
We want to remark that all these unique features are all
taken into consideration when designing security solutions for
EH networks.
III. ATTACKS AND THREATS IN ENERGY HARVESTING
NETWORKS
The underlying mechanisms and strategies enabling EH
principles expose wireless devices and networks to several
attacks at different layers of the protocol stack. These threats
extend beyond trivial eavesdropping attacks, and target the
overall availability of the network, its reliability, and its
dependability.
Different attacks have been identified and discussed in
the literature, each requiring specific tools and features by
the adversary and targeting specific enabling technologies. A
summary of these attacks is provided in Table III, concerning
the techniques and capabilities employed by the adversary.
Eavesdropping. First, as highlighted by several contribu-
tions such as [21], [22], and [23], RF EH networks are usually
deployed without any built-in encryption mechanism, exposing
the delivered energy and information to eavesdropping attacks.
Indeed, given that RF EH networks are usually characterized
by reduced energy availability compared to other EH sources,
integrating off-the-shelf encryption techniques is often not
suitable. These considerations have motivated a significant
literature production, both considering physical-layer security
schemes to improve data secrecy and suitable cryptography
techniques, tailored to devices with reduced energy avail-
ability. These research areas are discussed in details in the
following sections V and IV of this paper.
DoS. Moreover, the literature provides several descriptions
and practical examples of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks,
aimed at disrupting the availability of EH networks. In this
context, networks powered via RF signals are particularly
exposed. In this context, one of the simplest strategies to
quickly exhaust the energy provision of EH devices is to
realize energy-depletion attacks. As highlighted by the au-
thors in [26], an energy depletion attack is a form of DoS
attack, where the adversary sends bogus packets to a wireless-
powered node. The radio and processing operations required to
analyze and reject these bogus packets lead to a quick drain
of the device’s battery, preventing any further operation of
the node in the network. An example of energy depletion is
the flooding attack discussed by the authors in [61]. They
considered several attack scenarios where, for instance, the
adversary could: (i) introduce a malware in a WSN to increase
the transmission power (and thus, the energy consumption) of
legitimate devices; (ii) adopt jamming techniques to introduce
noise on the communication channel, to require the nodes
to increase the power transmission and increase the energy
consumption; and (iii) exploit the weakness of some traffic
aggregation scheme, to increase the size of the re-transmitted
packet.
When the transmitting devices use beamforming techniques
to increase physical-layer security, an attacker can launch
Beamforming Vector Poisoning attacks, injecting a malicious
signal on the same frequency used for legitimate communica-
tions [22]. This translates into a jamming attack and produces
destructive interference with the main communication link,
reducing the amount of energy that the node can use either
for energy charge or information decoding.
While being valid in the context of WSNs, the above con-
siderations apply also to the IoT, as discussed by the authors
in [68]. In this reference contribution, the authors highlighted
the feasibility of most common attack techniques, such as
jamming, replay, and spoofing towards the IoT constrained de-
vices. Moreover, they introduced the de-authentication dead-
lock attack. It is a type of DoS attack, affecting wireless nodes
authenticated to an access point. In this scenario, a malicious
user could spoof the victim device and inject unauthorized de-
authentication frames directed to the access point, forcing the
disconnection of the victim. Specific protection technologies
to defeat de-authentication deadlock attacks are discussed in
Section VI.
Other attacks at the physical layer of a WPCN are discussed
by the authors in [22]. Specifically, despite jamming can
be used also for dedicated network protection purposes (see
Section V-C), malicious adversaries can use this attack vector
to poison the communication channel used for the re-charging
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OVERVIEW OF ATTACKS AFFECTING ENERGY HARVESTING NETWORKS
Ref. Attack Name Target Enabling
Technologies
Attack Class Vulnerability Threat
[21], [22],
[23]
Unauthorized
Information
Sniffing
WPCN, SWIPT Eavesdropping No encryption Data leakage, passive
information acquisition
[61] Flooding WPCN DoS No native anti-malware
and intrusion detection
systems
Quick battery exhaustion
[62], [63],
[64], [65],
[66], [67],
[68], [69]
Jamming Generic EH network DoS No anti-jamming
solutions
Throughput degradation,
service interruption
[22] Beamforming
Vector Poisoning
WPCN, SWIPT DoS No interference detection
and anti-jamming
solutions
Resources exhaustion
[70], [71],
[72]
Stealthy
Collision
WPCN DoS No centralized
coordination entities
Energy depletion and
devices batteries
exhaustion
[68] Deauthentication
Deadlock
WPCN DoS No authentication and
encryption
Connection interruption
[73], [74] Electromagnetic
leaks, Power
Consumption,
Timing,
Powering
Leakages
SWIPT, WPCN Side Channel No tamper-resistant
solutions
Sensitive data leakage
[75] Back-scattered
RF Reflection
ABCN Side Channel No physical shielding
mechanisms
Sensitive data leakage
[76] Checkpoint
Tampering,
Power
Interruption
Generic EH network Device Tampering No integrity,
confidentiality,
authenticity
Full control of power
supply, infinite loops
[68] Playback WPCN Replay No freshness of
cryptography materials
Malicious
(re)transmissions of valid
data
[77] Pilot Signal
Spoofing
ABCN Spoofing No messages
authentication
Unauthorized delivering
of messages and energy
[22] Charging
(Cheating,
Leeching,
Flooding)
WPCN Spoofing No authentication and
throughput balance
solutions
Energy depletion and
battery exhaustion;
malicious nodes collude
to create packet collisions
against legitimate nodes
[68], [22] Impersonation ABCN, WPCN,
SWIPT
Man In The Middle No authentication Unrecognizable fake
nodes
[22] Malware WPCN Malware infection No suitable anti-malware
solutions
Energy depletion,
interruption of charging
operation
of the devices, leading to a DoS. Several contributions in
the literature highlighted the issues related to the jamming
attacks against a system with energy harvesting. With specific
reference to the control theory, the authors in [66] analyzed the
effects of the remote state estimation in a closed-loop system
under the jamming attacks, taking into account the commu-
nication channel properties. Further, they study how jamming
affects the performance in a scenario where energy harvesting
is employed for battery-powered sensors (transmitter-side), by
deriving a policy for the optimal energy allocation. Similarly,
the authors in [69] considered a WPCN where an attacker
intercepts the energy transmitted to a legitimate user. They
provided a theoretical model integrating game theory concepts,
and they leveraged this model to optimize the energy required
for the data transmission, and the attack policy to achieve
effective jamming attacks.
Side-channel. Side-channel attacks allow an adversary to
gain relevant information from the device, including secrets
keys or private data, by leveraging physical-layer features
such as electromagnetic and magnetic leaks, timing informa-
tion, and energy consumption. As discussed by the authors
in [73] and [74], side-channel attacks are a threat also for EH
networks. For instance, correlating the instantaneous energy
consumption and the electromagnetic leaks generated during
cryptography operations can reveal the secret key computed
by the node.
Replay & Spoofing. As highlighted by some contributions
such as [75] and [77], signals enabling ABCNs are not authen-
ticated, and thus they can be easily replayed and spoofed by an
attacker. While the authors in [77] contextualized this attack in
a WBAN, a specific type of side-channel attack technique has
been described also by the authors in [75], where a powerful
software malware is deployed in the network. This malware
extracts sensitive information from the victim, and it leverages
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a WiFi Network Interface Card (NIC) to force wireless devices
to backscatter surrounding RF signals, thus enabling a side-
channel used to stealthily transmit the information.
Device Tampering. Recently, the authors in [76] introduced
a side-channel attack specific to intermittent computing sys-
tems, such as EH devices. During a power loss period, these
systems use to save the state of the program as checkpoint(s)
into non-volatile memory. At the restoration time of the power
supply, the checkpoints are used to recover the state of the
system, to further proceed with the computations. Malicious
adversaries can exploit the power interruption as an attack vec-
tor, to: (i) read the checkpoint data; (ii) tamper the checkpoint
after the system restore; and (iii) finally, execute a checkpoint
replay attack, where the same checkpoint is restored infinitely
by executing the same section of code.
Malware Infection. We recall that another way for the
attacker to quickly drain devices’ battery include typical
malicious applications, deployed on purpose on the target
device to send multiple energy requests, degrading the system
throughput. An example has been provided by the authors
in [75] (previously described), where malware is used to force
a specific behavior on the target victim.
Other attacks specific to RF EH networks are the ones
targeting the trust of the messages used to provide the RF
energy to charge the devices. As discussed in Section II,
WPCNs require specific pilot signals emitted by dedicated
power beacons, that physically enable the harvested device.
However, these signals usually do not integrate any security
service, such as authentication, integrity, and confidentiality.
Thus, as summarized by the authors in [27], several attacks
can be launched.
Looking at the transmission side, the pilot signal used for
energy charging can be spoofed, leading to a Pilot Signal
Spoofing attack. This could happen also when the EH device
specifically requests power, sending a beacon request packet.
In such a scenario, the adversary can intercept this message
and impersonate the power beacon, reducing the throughput
and the lifetime of the EH device [77].
WPCNs are also vulnerable to charging attacks, that can be
categorized in leeching, (ii) greedy, and (iii) cheating charging
attacks. Leeching attacks are physical-layer attacks where
devices keep re-charging without sending explicit requests,
i.e., by taking advantage of energy leakages when powering
neighboring devices. This can affect the awareness of a power
beacon, especially if this is interested in maintaining an
accurate map of the energy availability of the EH nodes [22].
Greedy charging attacks involve greedy devices, continu-
ously requesting energy from the source, and thus preventing
other devices to request energy.
Cheating charging attacks, instead, involve a compromised
EH node, reporting inaccurate energy measurements to the
power source, forcing it to adjust (increasing or decreasing)
the reference power level. This can translate either in a DoS or
in an unauthorized energy charging attack. In the former, the
reduction of the power level of the RF source decreases the
size of the area where the signal is received, possibly excluding
some devices from receiving enough energy. In the latter,
increasing the power level of the pilot signal increases the area
where such signal is received, possibly enabling malicious EH
devices, controlled by the adversary.
We also highlight that, as discussed by the authors in [22],
the harvested energy is subject to sensitive changes due to
the presence of people in the deployment area. This property
could enable the attacker to infer sensitive information about
the status of the area surrounding the physical environment
where the EH network is deployed, such as the number of
people in the area, their movement, and distribution over time,
to cite a few, leading to severe privacy attacks.
Cooperative EH Networks. Finally, besides the above-
described attacks, it is worth mentioning some specific attacks
targeting the novel concept of Cooperative Energy Harvesting
Networks, highlighted by the authors in [27].
In cooperative EH networks, a generic source node S
transfers energy towards a destination node D, by leveraging
one or more relay nodes R. These networks do not support
any inherent security property hence, besides sharing the
same vulnerabilities of traditional WPCNs, these networks are
exposed to further threats. In particular, since energy messages
do not satisfy implicitly the integrity property, these networks
are exposed to energy state forgery attacks, where an adversary
can tamper the information about its energy state, and send the
tampered information towards a cooperator for illicit goals.
For instance, when a legitimate node requests energy to the
attacker, this latter one can refuse to provide it, claiming
an insufficient energy level. Moreover, a compromised node
can trigger repudiation of energy attacks, denying to own a
given amount of energy after the transfer process initiated
by a cooperator. In this case, the compromised node acts
as a black hole, accumulating energy locally and reducing
the energy availability on other cooperating devices. These
attacks can be anticipated by energy cheating attacks, where
the compromised node obtains sufficient trust from the victim.
First, the compromised node sends messages and operates
in the network as a legitimate device, gaining the necessary
trust from the network. Then, when the trust is established, it
requests energy from other devices and exhausts their energy
availability. Finally, cooperative EH networks could be also
exposed to collusion attacks, where multiple devices collude to
deny the reception of energy from a target cooperator device,
forcing it to repeat the energy delivering operations, quickly
exhausting the available energy.
The techniques to mitigate the above attacks leverage either
lightweight tailored cryptography solutions or physical-layer
features. The details are provided in sections IV and VI,
respectively.
IV. CRYPTOGRAPHY TECHNIQUES FOR EH DEVICES AND
NETWORKS
A significant branch of the works on security issues for EH
networks focus on the application of cryptography techniques
to EH devices, adapting the operations and the implementation
of the security operations to the new wave of systems. Specifi-
cally, the scientific contributions in this area strive to optimize
the implementation and the software/hardware architecture of
well-known cryptography approaches, based on the features
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and requirements typical of energy-harvesting networks. The
final aim is to come up with customized versions of cryp-
tography techniques, characterized by either intermittent or
less-demanding energy consumption, thus being suitable for
integration in devices powered via harvested sources.
Compared to the large amount of scientific contributions
investigating data secrecy issues at the physical-layer (see
Section V, cryptography approaches can guarantee the specific
security service in a deterministic fashion, while physical-
layer data approaches are characterized by a probabilistic
security protection. At the same time, these approaches usually
involve higher demand on the system, thus requiring the
implementation of dedicated optimization mechanisms.
An overview of the most important systemic features of
these proposals is provided in Table IV. Indeed, despite each
of these proposals is specifically meant for a particular EH
technique, we argue that the logic and strategies of these
proposals can be fully re-used even for additional EH sources
and networks, being a valuable alternative to physical-layer
security schemes and leading to feasible cryptography algo-
rithms for generic EH networks.
Adapting dynamically the provied security service is one of
the earliest strategies realized to cope with the limited energy
availability of EH devices, and it has been conceived by the
authors in [78], in the context of IEEE 802.15.4 networks.
They provided a software solution enabling a constrained
WSN device to change at run-time its communication secu-
rity settings, adapting dynamically to the charge level and
increasing the lifetime. Besides, they designed their system
to reduce the number of delivered packets (and thus, the
energy consumption) when scarce energy is available. They
contextualized their proposal and evaluated the energy and
lifetime gain via simulations. Recently, the authors in [79]
tackled a similar scenario, contextualizing the problem in
the novel Software Defined Networking (SDN) computing
paradigm.
The authors in [80] proposed a lightweight data schedul-
ing strategy, trading off between data security and energy
efficiency. Specifically, the proposed scheduling algorithm
includes two security primitives, i.e., a stronger but energy-
hungry one and a weaker but energy-efficient one. Depending
on the available energy on the wireless platform, for each batch
of data, the scheduler selects the most suitable, minimizing the
impact of secure data transmission on the lifetime of the EH
platform.
The authors in [81] studied energy consumption optimization
strategies to balance between security processing and energy
harvesting. Considering that during RF harvesting periods the
EH device cannot transmit or receive, and that the availability
of the RF source is intermittent, the authors compared the
effectiveness of either transmitting more small packets or
less long packets, as well as running security algorithms,
considering the harvesting availability of the devices.
A valuable contribution towards the identification and defini-
tion of the energy requirements for the authentication protocols
in EH devices has been provided by the authors in [82].
The authors evaluated the energy consumption of 18 different
authentication algorithms, measuring the energy expenditure
with different software configuration and hardware optimiza-
tions. Using a solar-powered MSP430 hardware platform, they
confirmed via experimental tests that energy efficiency can be
improved by including software optimizations, as well as by a
dynamic adaptation of the security level. A similar study has
been also provided recently by the authors in [96] on a PIC
micro-controller.
Many contributions, such as [83] – [87] exploited pre-
computation techniques. Indeed, as discussed in [97], EH
networks are characterized by intermittent connectivity and
charging periods, where time frames characterized by high en-
ergy availability are alternated with periods of scarce charging.
In addition, EH circuits in WPCN devices always lose energy
after reaching a given re-charge threshold, not fully exploring
the advantages of EH capabilities. Thus, pre-computation
techniques can be triggered during periods with high energy
availability, to both use all the available energy and anticipate
energy-demanding tasks, whose execution and energy cost
could be too demanding in other time frames. The authors
in [83] investigated the adaptability of well-known cryptogra-
phy algorithms to EH networks. Specifically, they worked on
the algorithm part, and they found that pre-computing and
storing a few key streams or parts of them can be useful
when the system experiences a low charging level. Thanks to
hybrid HW/SW optimizations, they optimized the CPU cycles
to reduce the time and the energy required by cryptography
operations, and they tested their methodology on real devices,
such as the MSP430 and the ATMega128L micro-controllers.
Pre-computation techniques were also exploited by the authors
in [84], to allow devices equipped with both IEEE 802.15.4
communication capabilities and EH principles to integrate ded-
icated cryptography techniques, such as the Ciphertext Policy
- Attribute Based Encryption (CP-ABE) technique. In the
proposed framework, namely AGREE, they provided specific
optimizations to the CP-ABE cryptography algorithm, they
pre-compute scalar multiplications during high-charge periods,
and they use the CP-ABE technique to encode a session key
instead of the data itself, translating an access control problem
into an encryption one. They implemented their strategy in real
constrained devices (the TelosB and MicaZ devices charged by
photo-voltaic cells), showing the effectiveness and the reduced
energy consumption of their methodology for EH networks.
Similarly, pre-computation techniques have been used by the
authors in [86] to reduce the energy cost of digital signature
algorithms by 44%, making them feasible for execution on a
solar-cell powered micro-controller.
Considering the heterogeneity in the harvesting capabilities of
an RF EH network, the authors in [88] designed HELIOS,
a distributed protocol that allows network elements experi-
encing low energy availability to outsource the most energy-
demanding operations to other nodes in the networks, being
them power-supplied or with excess energy available. Consid-
ering also the presence of untrusted devices in the network, the
authors discussed also specific strategies to reduce the impact
of untrusted network elements, thanks to batch verification
schemes. The authors extended their study in [87], where they
focused on the well-known Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA) protocol, used for authentication and
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TABLE IV
COMPARISON BETWEEN APPROACHES CONTEXTUALIZING CRYPTOGRAPHY SOLUTIONS IN EH NETWORKS.
THE SYMBOL N/A INDICATES THAT THE SPECIFIC FEATURE IS NOT APPLICABLE.
Scheme Scenario Target Security
Service
Solution
Type
Assessment
Methodology
Hardware
Board
EH Source Proposed Technique
[78],
[79]
IEEE
802.15.4
Authentication,
Confidentiality,
Integrity
Software Simulations N/A Generic Security service dynamic
adaptation
[80] IMD -
WSN
Confidentiality Software Real-Devices
Experiments
WISP RF Signal Security service dynamic
adaptation
[81] IoT Confidentiality Software Simulations N/A RF signals Security service dynamic
adaptation
[82] WSN Authentication Mixed
Hardware -
Software
Real-Devices
Experiments
MSP430 Solar cells Security service dynamic
adaptation
[83] WSN Confidentiality Mixed
Hardware -
Software
Emulation MSP430 and
the AVR
ATmega128l
Generic Pre-computation techniques
[84] IEEE
802.15.4
Confidentiality,
Access Control
Software Real-Devices
Experiments
TelosB Photovoltaic
Cells
Pre-computation techniques
[85] IEEE
802.15.4
AES Mixed
Hardware -
Software
Emulation MSP430,
ARM-Cortex
M4
Generic Pre-computation techniques
[86] WSN Digital Signature Software Real-Devices
Experiments
MSP430 Solar cells Pre-computation techniques
[87] IEEE
802.15.4
Generic
Exponentiation
Operations
Software Real-Devices
Experiments
MagoNode++,
TelosB, and
MICA2 motes
Photovoltaic
cells and
micro wind
turbines
Pre-computation techniques
[88] IEEE
802.15.4
Generic
Exponentiation
Operations
Software Emulation TelosB Generic Offloading to
energy-supplied devices
[89] WSN Mutual
Authentication
Software Simulations N/A Generic Implementation
optimizations for reduced
energy consumption
[90] WBAN Mutual
Authentication
Software Simulations N/A Electro-
cardiac
signals
Implementation
optimizations for reduced
energy consumption
[73] WSN Encryption Mixed
Hardware -
Software
Real-Devices
Experiments
MonoStick Solar Cells Implementation
optimizations for reduced
energy consumption
[91] IEEE
802.15.4
Authentication and
Encryption
Software Real-Devices
Experiments
GreenNET Photovoltaic
cells
RF Operations
Optimization
[92] WSN Key Agreement Software Simulations N/A Generic Optimization based on the
energy available on
neighboring devices
[93] IoT Secure Context
Saving
Hardware Emulation Not Available Generic Dedicated cryptography
techniques for context
saving
[94] WSN Hashing, Encryption Hardware Real-Devices
Experiments
EHS Platform Solar Panel Implementation
optimizations for reduced
energy consumption
[95] IoT Block Ciphers Software Simulations N/A Generic Implementation
optimizations for reduced
energy consumption
integrity verification. Specifically, they coupled well-known
ECC pre-computation techniques with the energy harvesting
concepts previously introduced, optimizing the usage of excess
energy and reducing energy waste due to the limited harvesting
capabilities of embedded devices. Similar pre-computation
optimizations were also provided by the authors in [85], where
the authors referred to the excess amount of data generated
during excess energy peaks as coupons. Such coupons have
been demonstrated to be a useful tool to speed up the execution
of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm in CTR
mode, as well as to speed-up hardware-based random numbers
generation.
Other contributions, instead, addressed the energy shortage
of EH networks by reducing the overall energy consumption
of the security protocol. For instance, the authors in [89] de-
signed a mutual authentication protocol for EH WSN that can
split computationally-demanding operations among multiple
periods, leveraging energy-aware checkpoints where the state
of the system is saved and restored. Similarly, a protocol using
electro-cardiac signals for harvesting and key generation has
been proposed by the same authors in [90].
In [91], the authors address security issues as well. In partic-
ular, the authors introduced and described the novel GREEN-
net harvested hardware platform. This platform integrates
application-layer security with the OSCAR architecture, which
enjoys reduced energy consumption by decreasing the un-
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necessary handshake operations required by the standardized
DTLS protocol.
The authors in [92] focused on the key agreement security
problem, and provided a strategy that allows optimizing the
pairwise keys selection and distribution in an EH WSN. The
optimization consists of balancing the number of reinforce-
ment links and the availability of reinforcement neighbors
based on the harvested energy available on the devices willing
to share a key. Moreover, it is worth highlighting the recent
disclosure of a hardware platform specifically dedicated to the
testing of cryptography algorithms in EH-powered devices,
recently presented by the authors in [94]. In their demonstra-
tion, they showed that a maximum charging time of 60 s is
necessary to execute the most energy-demanding cryptography
scheme, i.e., HMAC-SHA. While this latter work provides
action on the hardware perspective, the authors in [95] focused
on the software part, optimizing the size and the operations
required by a block cipher to reduce its energy consumption,
making it feasible for EH devices.
Finally, in the context of cooperative EH networks, the authors
in [27] discussed some countermeasures against the attacks
described in Section III. They evaluated the inclusion of a
registration authority and a trusted module in each device,
to include additional security features in EH Cooperative
Networks. High-level countermeasures such as the inclusion
of period energy state reports via trusted modules, energy dual
signatures via PKI-based methods, and the integration of sym-
metric and asymmetric encryption techniques are discussed.
However, there is no evaluation of their impact on networks
with a very limited budget, neither proposals to make their
integration energy-friendly.
A. Lessons Learned
From the literature review summarized in the previous
subsection, we notice that devices powered via non-RF sources
(solar, wind, mechanical, thermoelectric) are usually char-
acterized by higher energy availability per unit of time, if
compared to systems powered via RF sources. Therefore, they
can likely afford the execution of a limited set of cryptography
primitives, optimized in such a way to meet the constraints of
these devices.
Without loss of generality, as the most important lesson
learned from our study, three main research methodologies
have been identified by the literature overview provided in the
previous section.
Dynamic Security Service Adaptation. Given that energy
availability in EH devices is intermittent, one of the strategies
highlighted in the literature is to provide a framework that
acts in strict combination with an energy indicator. As soon
as more energy becomes available, authentication and confi-
dentiality are strengthened, while they are relaxed when the
available energy reduces. Despite such schemes are valuable
in balancing energy and security, they are particularly subject
to jamming attacks. Indeed, it is enough for the adversary
to reduce the charging profile of the device to lower the
corresponding security level.
Security Operations Optimization. Following a similar
logic to the one already used in constrained environments such
as WSNs, other contributions cope with the energy limitation
in EH networks by reducing the overall energy consumption
of the cryptography protocols. This is achieved both by
outsourcing the most demanding security operations and by
optimizing the energy cost of some operations within block
ciphers, often at the cost of a reduced security level. Despite
being less vulnerable to jamming attacks, these strategies are
often characterized by a reduced security level, not being
suitable for deployment scenarios where adversaries can enjoy
unlimited capabilities.
Pre-Computation to Optimize Energy Usage in EH Net-
works. One of the most effective strategies to provide security
in EH networks is pre-computation. Indeed, pre-computation
techniques take advantage of the periods when the device
is fully powered, and anticipate the execution of the most
energy-demanding tasks in these periods. Despite requiring
significant engineering efforts on the cryptography protocols
logic, pre-computation techniques allow maintaining the same
security level of well-known solutions, successfully defeating
both temporary jamming attacks and powerful adversaries.
However, there are two main drawbacks. First, when the device
experiences a prolonged period of reduced energy availability,
the pre-computed values could be exhausted, leaving the de-
vice with no more energy to execute security tasks. Second, the
design of pre-computation strategies should be validated by the
scientific community, avoiding the creation of vulnerabilities
in widely-accepted cryptography techniques.
B. Future Directions
A few appealing research directions for cryptography solu-
tions in the context of EH networks are provided below.
Optimization Strategies Integration. Despite the three
strategies discussed in the previous subsections have received
significant attention from the latest literature, still the inte-
gration between such strategies has not been explored. For
instance, coupling the optimization of encryption operations
with the dynamic adaptation of the security service could
increase the minimum security level of the device. In this con-
text, efficient frameworks are required to synchronize energy
availability, expenditure, and security level tuning operations.
EH Platforms Security Evaluations. At the time of this
writing, there is no scientific contribution experimentally val-
idating the security of cryptography solutions on EH devices.
Indeed, benchmarking the security of solutions tailored for
EH devices, such as pre-computation techniques, is crucial to
validate their strength and refine their security against evolving
adversaries. In parallel, automatic security validation tools
could help in establishing the security of either code opti-
mization techniques and pre-computation strategies, avoiding
the deployment of possibly weak security techniques.
V. DATA SECRECY ISSUES IN ENERGY HARVESTING
NETWORKS
Building on the very limited energy availability of EH net-
works and the general unsuitability of traditional cryptography
techniques, several scientific contributions provided strategies
to enforce physical-layer data secrecy in EH networks. More in
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detail, the schemes discussed and cross-compared in Section V
implicitly assume that EH-powered devices are not able to
run cryptography primitives, and thus they can neither encrypt
data nor manage energy-consuming TCP-s connections. Thus,
without any further protection, the related RF communications
would be easily eavesdropped by a passive adversary. This
is the reason motivating the intensive literature production
intended to achieve security via non-cryptography schemes.
These contributions largely focused on RF EH, for two main
reasons. First, as highlighted by the comparison in Table II,
RF EH harvesting techniques usually provide the least amount
of power per time unit, justifying the assumption about the
impracticality of cryptography techniques [98]. Second, the
research community has been attracted by the challenging
trade-offs between energy, security, throughput, and reliability,
typical of wireless-powered networks.
In this section, we first introduce the security objectives
most used when investigating data secrecy at the physical-
layer (see Section V-A). Then, we describe the logic driving
the introduction of relaying and friendly jamming strategies in
RF EH networks (see Section V-B and Section V-C). Without
loss of generality, we notice that, despite investigating all the
same security metrics discussed in Section V-A, the contri-
butions available in the literature are characterized by many
differences, related to the assumed scenario, the adversarial
model, and the specific objective.
To provide a meaningful and insightful overview of these
works, we split the overall literature into three main categories,
according to the specific adversarial model. Three adversarial
models are mainly assumed: (i) external (Section V-D); (ii)
internal (Section V-E); and, (iii) untrusted relays (Section V-F).
The most important take-home messages arising from our
discussion are summarized in Section V-G, while Section V-H
highlights appealing future research directions in the area.
We remark that this section investigates and classifies only
scientific contributions specifically tackling data secrecy secu-
rity issues in EH networks. Thus, schemes focusing on EH
network performance, not considering security issues, are out
of scope for our work (indeed, exhaustive description and
classification of these approaches can be found in dedicated
surveys, such as [35] and [34]).
A. Security Objectives
The operations of ABCN, WPCN, and SWIPT networks can
be optimized based on several design objectives, by selecting
suitable beamforming vectors, or optimizing the transmission
strategies and the deployment of the entities in the system.
Several features are optimized in the literature, including
the total transmission power at the transmitter, the energy
expenditure at the receivers, the harvested power, and the
throughput of the communication link.
In this manuscript, being focused on security issues, we are
particularly interested in two security-related metrics, which
are the secrecy rate and the secrecy outage probability.
Considering an eavesdropper E is deployed in the scenario
and it is interested in the correct decoding of information
directed toward one of the legitimate devices, the secrecy rate
of the legitimate source-to-destination communication link at
the physical layer is defined as in the following Eq. 14:
Sn = Cn − Ce, (14)
where Cn is the capacity of the legitimate channel and Ce is
the capacity of the channel source-eavesdropper [99]. A large
part of contributions in the literature formulate proposals to
maximize the secrecy rate (Secrecy Rate Maximization (SRM)
problem), by suitably selecting the power splitting ratio, the
time splitting factor, and the weights in the beamforming
vector. At the same time, other contributions investigated
the performance bounds of the secrecy capacity, such as the
strictly positive secrecy capacity (SPSC) problem, defined
as the probability that the secrecy capacity remains strictly
positive.
Another important security metric evaluating the physical
layer data secrecy of a transmission scheme is the Secrecy
Outage Probability (SOP), defined as the probability that
the instantaneous secrecy capacity drops below a specific
threshold value S, as defined in the following Eq. 15
SOPn = Pr (Sn < S) = Pr
[
log2
(
1 + SINRn
1 + SINRe
)
< S
]
.
(15)
Few papers in the literature focused on an additional
security-related metric, which is the Ergodic Secrecy Rate
(ESR). It is defined as the maximum achievable transmission
rate of the legitimate link, not enabling correct decoding of the
information on the eavesdropper. As in the following Eq. 16,
it can be modeled as the average of the instantaneous secrecy
rate jointly considering all the possible channel realizations:
En = E [Cn − Ce] =
= E
{
1
2
[log2 (1 + SINRn)− log2 (1 + SINRe)]+
}
,
(16)
where the operator (·)+ refers to the maximum positive value.
Other scientific contributions such as [100], [101], and
[102], focused on the optimization of the Secrecy Energy
Efficiency (SEE) metric, that is a trade-off between the secrecy
rate of the communication link and the energy consumption on
the EH devices. In practice, energy metrics (such as the power
consumption on the transmitter and the consumed energy at
the receiver) are coupled with the above security metrics, not
to decrease below a given threshold.
Finally, it is worth noting that the above-introduced metrics
could also be treated as constraints of an optimization prob-
lem. Thus, many contributions in the literature focus on the
optimization of a non-security-related metric, while minimum
constraints on the secrecy rate or maximum constraint on the
secrecy outage probability are included in the optimization
problem to still guarantee data secrecy at the physical layer.
B. Relaying Models and Strategies
While the above considerations are valid for single-hop EH
networks, many contributions in the literature also investigated
multi-hop scenarios, where either the receivers forward the
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information to intermediate nodes in the network or there is not
a direct link between the source and the intended destination.
In these cases, dedicated relaying nodes are introduced to
accomplish communication tasks.
To enable energy harvesting and information forwarding at
the same time, two relaying strategies are mainly discussed in
the literature, namely Decode and Forward (DF) and Amplify
and Forward (AF).
In the DF mode, after the reception of the signal, the relay
decodes and re-transmits it as a new signal. In the AF mode,
instead, without decoding the signal, the relay amplifies it
using a power factor depending on the amount of harvested
energy. It is worth noting that, as discussed by the authors
in [103], either the TS or the PS hardware architectures can
be adopted on the relay for EH and information processing,
leading to different SNR, throughput, and security considera-
tions.
While most of the scientific contributions assumed trusted
relays, few of them introduced untrusted relays and provide
strategies to protect the information from honest-but-curious
relays, achieving their forwarding tasks but also interested in
stealing the information. More details on this adversary model
are provided in Section V-F.
C. Artificial Noise
As discussed in the previous sections, the security of the
legitimate source-destination communication link, evaluated
through metrics such as the secrecy rate and the secrecy
capacity (see Sec. V-A), is strictly dependent on the difference
between the SINR at the legitimate destination and the SINR
experienced by the eavesdropper. Thus, an effective strategy
to further reduce the SINR at the eavesdroppers is to deploy
a friendly jammer. A friendly jammer emits artificial noise on
the communication channel in a way that its effect is almost
nullified at the legitimate receiver, while it is amplified on any
other device in the network, leading to an overall decrease of
the SINR.
Artificial noise can be introduced in the network by different
entities, i.e., a helper node and the destination. When artificial
noise is introduced by the helper, the scenario typically in-
volves a dedicated jammer device, continuously emitting noise
on the channel. Other contributions couple the roles of the
relay and the jammer, selecting helper devices in the set of
relays that are not used for signal relaying at a particular time.
At the same time, artificial noise can be also introduced
by the legitimate destination when the receiving device is
equipped with multiple antennas. In this case, while one or
more of the antennas are receiving the signal, the remaining
ones emit artificial noise, summing up (in voltage) to one of
the legitimate signals. On the one hand, the signal available
at the receiver results corrupted by the noise. On the other
hand, given that the receiving node is aware of the samples of
the noise, it can cancel out (by subtraction) the intentional
interference and confidentially recover the original signal.
Several schemes employing friendly jamming are discussed
in the sections below.
D. External Adversaries
We define an external adversary as a device that does not
take part in the regular communication patterns in the net-
work, thus remaining anonymous to the network devices. This
scenario is typical of any wireless network scenario, including
WSN and IoT networks, where an external eavesdropper sim-
ply needs a receiving antenna tuned on the same frequency of
the legitimate communication channel to successfully decode
the information — assuming no cryptography techniques are
deployed.
The distinguishing feature of these works is the unavailabil-
ity of any information about the adversary. From the model
perspective, this assumption translates in the general unavail-
ability of the Channel State Information (CSI) experienced
by the eavesdropper communication links, further complicat-
ing the design of an optimally-secure solution. Indeed, with
no information about the adversary and the quality of the
channel it experiences, it is possible to work only on the
main communication links, either minimizing the probability
that the information is correctly decoded by other devices
in the network or maximizing the secrecy rate of the main
communication links.
A classification of the scientific contributions assuming
external adversaries is provided in Table V, considering the
features and capabilities of the adversaries. It is worth noting
that all the scientific contributions discussed hereby assumed
completely-passive eavesdroppers, that do not transmit any-
thing on the RF spectrum.
We notice that, overall, very different adversarial models
are considered in the literature.
Single Single-Antenna External Eavesdropper. The sim-
plest adversary model is a single external eavesdropper,
equipped with a single omnidirectional antenna, such as the
one assumed in [104]— [117].
To provide a few examples, the authors in [104] contextualized
the concepts of RF-SWIPT in Visible Light Communications
(VLC) systems, studying the energy harvesting performance
when visible-light signals are used as a source. Assuming
a single-antenna eavesdropper and a random location of the
eavesdropper to the receiver, they derived the exact analytical
expressions of the asymptotic SOP, by using the stochastic
geometry method, and they evaluated the overall secrecy rate
via simulations. Assuming the same adversarial model, the
authors in [106] provided a significant contribution to the def-
inition of the secrecy rate that can be achieved via cooperative
jamming strategies. They showed that the deployment of a
full-duplex jammer node can improve significantly the secrecy
rate, and such improvement is highly dependent on the time
split ratio for EH activities, the features of the channel, and
the topology of the scenario. The authors in [109] focused on
buffer-aided networks, where the messages can be temporarily
stored on the relays for several slots, waiting to select the
transmission link that maximizes the communication secrecy.
Assuming either an offline or an online knowledge of the main
communication channels, the authors developed a protocol that
can jointly optimize the power allocation at the transmitter
and the secrecy rate at the receiver, considering the relay
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TABLE V
QUALITATIVE COMPARISON AMONG APPROACHES INVESTIGATING PHY-LAYER DATA SECRECY IN EH NETWORKS CONFRONTING EXTERNAL
EAVESDROPPERS.
Adversary CSI
Availability
Adversarial
Distribution
Collusion Adversarial
Receiving
Antennas
Adversarial
Antenna
Type
Adversary
Mobility
Distance
Considera-
tions
Scheme Security
Treatment
External 7 Single 7 Single Omni-
directional
7 7 [104],
[105],
[106]
Minimum SOP
[107] Constraint,
Minimum SOP
[108],
[109],
[110]
Average
Secrecy Rate
[111] SOP, ESR
[112] SOP, SRM
[113],
[114]
Secrecy
Capacity
Maximization
[115] SPSC Bounds
[116] Secrecy Outage
Capacity
[117] SOP, Secrecy
Rate
[118] Multiple Users
Secrecy Rate
[119] Secrecy Rate
External Imperfect Single 7 Single Omni-
Directional
7 7 [120],
[121]
SRM
[122] SOP and SPSC
probability
[123] SOP
External 7 Single 7 Multiple Omni-
Directional
7 7 [124] SRM
[125] Constraint,
Minimum
Secrecy Rate
[126] SOP
Minimization
External 7 Multiple 7 Single Omni-
Directional
7 7 [127],
[128],
[129]
Secrecy
Capacity
Definition and
Maximization
[130] SOP
[131],
[132]
SRM, SOP
Minimization
[133] Constraint,
Minimum SOP
[134] Secrecy
Capacity
External 7 Multiple 7 Single Directional 7 7 [135] SRM, Ergodic
Secrecy
Capacity
External Imperfect Multiple X Single Omni-
Directional
7 7 [136] SOP
External Imperfect Multiple 7 Multiple Omni-
Directional
7 7 [137],
[138]
Constraint,
Minimum
Secrecy Rate
[139] SOP
[140] Secrecy Rate
External Imperfect Multiple 7 Single Omni-
Directional
7 Imperfect
Locations
[15] Secrecy Rate
External 7 Multiple 7 Single Directional 7 HPPP [141] Secrecy Rate
[142] Lower-bound
SRM
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transmit power optimization and link selection strategies. We
also highlight the work by the authors in [116], wherein a
constrained relay is considered. This relay is equipped with a
large number of input and output antennas, according to the
Massive-Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO) technology.
The authors unveiled explicit closed-form expressions for the
secrecy outage capacity of a link where the above-described
relay is deployed, both assuming the Amplify and Forward
and the Decode and Forward relaying mode.
While the previous contributions assumed no knowledge
and previous information about the adversarial channel, the
authors in [120]— [123] worked with the Imperfect CSI
assumption, still considering a single adversary with a single
antenna. In these settings, they evaluated the impact of such
an assumption on the achievable security metrics.
For instance, the authors in [120] considered a generic
Multiple-Input Single-Output (MISO) scenario. However, dif-
ferently from previous works, they maximize the worst-case
secrecy rate of the communication link by decoupling the
optimization problem into three unique optimization prob-
lems. Using such a strategy, they found a locally-optimum
solution utilizing the alternating optimization algorithm. In
the context of a multi-relay network, the authors in [121]
introduced a relay selection scheme where the relays that can
not decode the signal assume the role of friendly jammers,
further improving the physical layer security of the scheme
compared to regular beamforming schemes. Differently, the
authors in [122] focused on the design of a novel jammer,
working accordingly to the Accumulate-and-Jam logic. This
jammer, being energy-constrained, stores energy locally and
then uses such energy to perform cooperative jamming. It
is worth noting that, differently from other approaches, here
the focus is mainly on the communication link between the
source of a message and the jammer, where the jammer is
intended as a destination. The authors investigated both the
design logic of the jammer and its performance in a wiretap
channel, considering a single-antenna eavesdropper. Finally,
they show the benefits of such design compared to a regular
Half-Duplex approach.
Single Multi-Antenna External Eavesdropper. While
the above contributions assumed a single adversarial device
equipped with a single antenna, other works, such as [124]—
[126] provided similar studies assuming a more powerful
external adversary, characterized by multiple receiving anten-
nas. For instance, the authors in [125] analyzed the effect of
non-idealities such as residual hardware impairments in EH
devices, CSI imperfections, and non-linearity of EH circuits on
the security and energy performance of a SWIPT EH network.
In this challenging system model, they considered the secrecy
rate of the system toward a multiple-antenna eavesdropper,
and they minimized the total power consumption while, at the
same time, guaranteeing the minimum required secrecy rate
of the main communication links.
Multiple Non-Colluding Single-Antenna External Eaves-
droppers. A slightly different adversarial model is the one
where there are multiple adversaries, each equipped with a
single omnidirectional receiving antenna. It is worth noting
that this adversarial model could be either more powerful or
similar to the one where there is a single adversary equipped
with multiple antennas, based on the possibility that the adver-
saries collude. Indeed, if the adversaries do not collude, i.e.,
do not share information, this model has the same strength and
modeling than the single adversary - single antenna attacker
model. Instead, when the adversaries can share information,
additional statistic analysis and processing tools can be used,
based on the difference in the location where the raw signals
are acquired.
The contributions in [127]— [133] assumed non-colluding ad-
versaries, and investigated the secrecy and energy performance
of RF EH networks in this adversarial models. For instance,
the authors in [127] considered a MISO system, where a single
source node, equipped with multiple antennas, would like to
transmit a signal to a specific destination node. The authors
formulated an optimization problem by defining the channel
secrecy capacity as the system performance metric to be opti-
mized, and they used the semi-definite relaxation mathematical
tool to solve the optimization problem. Their general finding
is that increased values of the SINR lead to increased secrecy
capacity, while the proposed resolution strategy helps to reduce
the overall transmit power to achieve a given level of secrecy
capacity, compared to traditional approaches. Assuming the
same adversarial model, the authors in [128] considered the
effect on the secrecy rate of destination-assisted jamming, as
discussed in Section V-C. Assuming a relay-based network
working in the AF mode, they organized the transmission of
the secret signal in two stages. In the first one, when the
source node transmits the signal to the relay, the destination
emits artificial noise to both protect the secrecy of the signal
and power the relay node. Then, in the second phase, the
destination receives the message from the relay and cancels
out its own signal, recovering the intended message from the
source node. The authors provided a thorough investigation of
the secrecy capacity in this scenario, assuming either TS-based
or PS-based hardware architecture, and considering the impact
of several system parameters, including the time dedicated
to EH, the power splitting ratio, the noise, and the location
of the participating entities. Their study revealed that PS
generally outperforms TS when all the other parameters do
not change. Besides, they analytically proved that the secrecy
capacity of the system can be maximized in several different
ways, including the increase of the number of relays, the
noise power, and the distance of the eavesdropper to the main
communication links.
The performance in the presence of a dedicated friendly
jammer device are investigated by the authors in [131], as-
suming both the knowledge and the absence of the CSI of
the eavesdroppers. Assuming a MISO scenario, the authors
investigated the SRM and the SOP minimization in a WPCN,
where the jammer is powered via EH and follows a TS
logic. They also extend the results to a MIMO scenario,
demonstrating that their solutions are even more successful
in protecting data at the physical layer when more users and
more eavesdroppers are considered.
A novel two-way relaying WPCN scenario has been consid-
ered by the authors in [129], where a source node eliminates its
own component from the signal received by the relay, through
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self-cancellation techniques. In this novel setting, the authors
derived optimally secure protocols based on power-splitting
and time-splitting, able to maximize the secrecy capacity of
the link assuming multiple non-colluding eavesdroppers.
Multiple Non-Colluding Multi-Antenna External Eaves-
droppers. Multiple non-colluding eavesdroppers equipped
with multiple antennas are considered by the contributions
in [137]— [140]. For instance, the authors in [138] jointly used
constructive interference and artificial noise to achieve secure
communications in SWIPT systems. Assuming the sample
case of an 8-PSK modulation, they showed that constructive
interference pre-coding schemes can achieve significant power
savings compared to interference management approaches,
while also getting rid of EH outages that characterize legacy
approaches. While the main focus on this contribution is on
the power management part, the secrecy rate of the link is
considered as a constraint of the problem, in a way to decade
below a given acceptable threshold.
Multiple Colluding External Eavesdroppers. Multiple
colluding external adversaries have been considered recently,
only by the authors in [136]. In this context, the authors first
verified that colluding capabilities improve the performance
of the adversary, thanks to the sharing of information. In
addition, they demonstrate that a trade-off between security
and reliability exists. Indeed, when more relaxed constraints
on the secrecy outage probability are imposed, higher SINR
values can be achieved, improving the reliability of the com-
munication link.
Directional Antennas. Other significant contributions are
the works in [135]— [142], where multiple non-colluding ad-
versaries are equipped with directional antennas. In particular,
while omnidirectional antennas are characterized by almost an
equal receiving range in all directions, directional antennas
can boost the receiving range along a particular direction.
From the security perspective, this is an additional powerful
feature, as it can help to eliminate interferences caused by
other RF activities, while focusing on a given target device or
communication link.
Specifically, the authors in [142] focused on a mmWave IoT
relay network, where the relays are mobile Unmanned Aerial
Vehicless (UAVs). A unique assumption of this work is the
inclusion of a statistical distribution of the distance of the
eavesdroppers from the main communication link, following
an independent Homogeneous Poisson Point Process (HPPP)
distribution with density λ on the ground. The inclusion of
directional antennas is modeled via the usage of a 3D antenna
gain model, to approximate the antenna gain pattern of all
nodes, as described in [143]. The authors analyzed the impact
of the density and the distribution of the adversaries around the
target device, deriving lower bounds on the average secrecy
rate relatively to the transmit power, the power splitting
ratio and the deployment of the UAVs. In [141], the same
authors of the above cited paper, were among the first ones to
investigate the secrecy performance of mmWave SWIPT UAV-
based relay systems. An important difference characterizing
this work is in the model of the air-to-ground channels, that
are considered as Nakagami-m small-scale fading. Under these
new assumptions, the authors computed the expressions of the
achievable secrecy rate, assuming both Detect-and-Forward
(DF) and Amplify-and-Forward (AF) schemes at the relay,
and they investigated the relationship between all the metrics
of the system.
The usage of UAVs as elements of the network infrastruc-
ture can be found also in the contribution by the authors
in [15]. A distinctive feature of this work is in the application
of EH capabilities on the UAVs, essentially for information
decoding and relay, while an onboard battery supplies energy
for the flight control of the UAVs. The authors assume multiple
non-colluding terrestrial eavesdroppers, trying to infer on the
data transmitted by a source, and relayed by the UAVs to the
intended destination. In this scenario, they derived the secrecy
rate of the communication link, considering as a new factor
of the optimization problem the relative position of the UAV
toward the source and the destination. UAVs are also used as
transmitters in the contribution by the authors in [119], in com-
bination with the Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access (NOMA)
technique to achieve secure transmissions against a single
single-antenna eavesdropper. To further improve the secrecy of
the communication, the authors use artificial friendly jamming,
to further decrease the chances for the eavesdropper to fully
decode the data delivered by the UAV. Considering a non-
linear EH model, the authors derived the secrecy rate of the
communication link and maximize jointly the throughput of
the communication link, the TS ratio, and the PS ratio.
Finally, we highlight that while these valuable contributions
brought the novelty of directional antennas in the RF EH
physical-layer security area, they did not explore collusion
capabilities, still posing severe constraints on the capabilities
of the adversary.
E. Internal Adversaries
We define an internal adversary as a device that is a
legitimate member of the network, actively taking part in the
network activities by transmitting and receiving information.
In the physical-layer security literature for RF EH networks,
such an adversarial model is often referred to as an active
eavesdropper, being it characterized both by active legitimate
features (authorized transmissions/reception operations) and
by unauthorized passive features (i.e., unauthorized passive
eavesdropping of the communications) [144].
While this scenario could be typical of any wireless net-
work, it is particularly adopted in the context of Cognitive Ra-
dio Networks. Specifically, Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs)
involve both primary users and secondary users. Primary users
are express-class licensed devices that pay a fee to experience
a minimum guaranteed level of Quality of Service (QoS) for
their traffic. Secondary users, often referred to as cognitive
users, are non-licensed users that are allowed to use the same
spectrum of primary users provided that their RF operations do
not interfere with them or do not cause excessive degradation
of the service offered to primary users. Overall, a CRN is
classified based on the paradigm used by secondary users to
access the spectrum, and it can be either interweave, underlay,
or overlay. While the underlying logic and techniques used
by CRNs are out of the scope of this contribution, the most
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interesting feature of CRNs within the scope of this survey
is the assumed knowledge of the presence of eavesdropping
adversaries, often identified in the secondary users, interested
in decoding RF activities of the primary users.
Given that these devices are part of the network and actively
participate in the communications, the CSI experienced by
these devices can be assumed as well-known or, at least,
statistically available on the source of the confidential com-
munication. Thus, the transmission and the security of the
communication link can be optimized by degrading its per-
ceived quality on the eavesdroppers, boosting its secrecy rate.
A comprehensive classification of the scientific contribu-
tions assuming internal adversaries is provided in Table VI,
with reference to the features and capabilities of the adver-
saries.
Single Single-Antenna Internal Eavesdropper. The most
common scenario investigated in the literature assumes a
single internal adversary, whose CSI is well-known, equipped
with a single omni-directional antenna, as in the contributions
by the authors in [145]— [168].
To provide a few examples, the authors in [150] were the
first to consider a system with a single source node and one
destination node, where the information transfer is aided by a
network of cooperative relays. In this scenario, all the relays
work according to the EH-TS logic, and they are partitioned
in two subsets. Some of them only forward packets to the des-
tination, while the remaining ones, also referred to as helpers,
act as friendly jammers, injecting random noise. This jamming
operation is performed smartly, to minimally affect the SINR
of the signal on the intended destination, while degrading the
most the SINR at any other location. At the same time, the
scenario includes a single-antenna eavesdropper, located far
from the main communication links. In the paper, the authors
obtained via the semi-definite relaxation mathematical tool the
configuration of the beamforming matrix that can achieve the
maximization of the secrecy rate of the main communication
link, by also controlling the power consumption on the relays.
Considering the same system scenario and adversary model,
the authors in [159] extended the analysis, and they found that
the secrecy of the data can be enhanced either by increasing the
number of relays, or by increasing the SINR at the destination,
or by balancing the TS ratio between energy harvesting and
information decoding.
In the same network model assumed by the authors in [159],
the authors in [149] modeled the batteries of the destination
node as a queuing system, and they proposed a scheme to
maximize the secrecy rate optimizing the transmission time of
the source node. At the same time, the artificial noise emission
by the jammer is optimized to cancel at the destination’s
location, while being effective at other locations. Assuming
a similar scenario than [159] and [150], the authors in [145]
considered an SR hardware design, and a single relay, only
working according to the TS-AF scheme. The authors assumed
that the CSI of the whole network is known and, under this
assumption, they proposed an iterative algorithm rooted in the
Constrained Concave Convex Procedure (CCCP) mathematical
tool. Their proposed algorithm provides a locally-optimum so-
lution, maximizing the secrecy rate of the link, simultaneously
fulfilling the constraints on the overall transmission power
and harvested energy on the receiver. Still assuming a SISO
system but with a Power Splitting (PS) hardware architecture,
the authors in [146] first introduced the concept of the active
eavesdropper. They focused on the relaying logic, evaluating
the secrecy capacity of the communication link when either
the DF or the AF strategy is used by the EH relays. Via
Monte-Carlo simulations, they demonstrated the DF strategy
to be more confidential than the AF strategy, and that both
the strategies have the potential to improve the secrecy rate
when an increased number of relays are deployed, and when
the relays are closer to the destination than the eavesdropper.
A MIMO system has been considered by the authors in [147],
where the receivers are based on the Separate Receiver (SR)
hardware architecture. Initially, without including any relay
nor jamming activity in the system model, they considered
two specific scenarios (single-stream and full-stream), and for
each of them they point out globally optimum solutions based
on the semi-definite relaxation mathematical tool. Then, for an
expanded scenario including relays producing artificial noise
via jamming, they discuss the solution of an equivalent prob-
lem based on the Inexact Block Coordinate Descent (IBCD)
algorithm, and they evaluate its performance in maximizing the
secrecy rate of the communication link. In the same scenario,
the authors in [148] considered a receiver equipped with only
a single antenna, and modeled the channel as slow-fading.
They formulated the optimization problem to maximize the
worst-case secrecy, assuming the overall transmission power
and the amount of harvested energy as the constraints of the
optimization problem.
Despite many contributions considered the involvement of
relays in the system, the reason motivating network devices
to behave as nodes has received only minimal attention by the
community. In this context, a pioneering contribution has been
provided by the authors in [153], where the relays are selected
by the transmitter from a set of devices, and they are following
remunerated in the form of minimum provided energy, that can
be harvested and used by the relay to fulfill their own tasks
in the network. To ensure fair participation of the relays, and
to motivate them to reveal trustful information, the authors
developed a relay selection strategy enforcing their honest
behavior, while dishonest ones are penalized by decreasing
their trust degree.
The secrecy rate at the physical layer has been investigated
also by the authors in [154], considering a network using
the Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM)
scheme. To improve the achievable secrecy rate, the authors
deployed a jammer that is cooperative with the legitimate
devices. The jammer works accordingly to the harvest-and-
jam logic, gaining energy from the information message in the
first phase of the information transmission, and jamming the
message at the eavesdropper in the second phase. Differently
from previous contributions assuming this scenario, following
a logic similar to the previous contribution in [196]. the authors
considered two different kinds of receivers, namely Type I and
Type II, equipped or not with the capabilities of removing the
noise on the reception side, respectively. Thus, they derive
SRM definition in this scenario with the above constraints,
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TABLE VI
QUALITATIVE COMPARISON AMONG APPROACHES INVESTIGATING PHY-LAYER DATA SECRECY IN EH NETWORKS CONFRONTING INTERNAL
ADVERSARIES.
Adversary CSI
Availability
Adversarial
Distribution
Collusion Adversarial
Receiving
Antennas
Adversarial
Antenna
Type
Adversary
Mobility
Distance
Considera-
tions
Scheme Security
Treatment
Internal X Single 7 Single Omni-
Directional
7 7 [145],
[146], [147],
[148], [149],
[150], [151],
[152], [153],
[154], [155],
[144]
SRM
[156] SRM,
Constraint SOP
[157] Constraint,
Minimum
Secrecy Rate
[158],
[159], [160],
[161], [162],
[163], [164]
SOP
Minimization
[165], [166] Secrecy
Capacity
Definition and
Maximization
[167] Eavesdropping
Probability
[168], [169] Secrecy Rate -
Harvesting
Ratio
Trade-Off
[170] Secrecy
Throughput
Internal Imperfect Single 7 Single Omni-
Directional
7 7 [171] Constraint,
Minimum SOP
Internal X Single 7 Multiple Omni-
Directional
7 7 [172], [173] Minimum
SRM
[173] ESR
[174] Constraint,
Minimum
Secrecy Rate
Internal 7 Single 7 Single Omni-
Directional
7 7 [175] SOP, SRM
Internal N/A Single 7 Multiple Omni-
Directional
7 7 [176] Avg. Secrecy
Capacity,
Lower Bound
SOP
Internal X Multiple 7 Single Omni-
Directional
7 7 [177], [178] Constraint,
Minimum
Eavesdropper
SINR
[179], [180] Constraint,
Maximum SOP
[181], [182] Constraint,
Minimum
Eavesdropper
Secrecy Rate
[23], [183],
[184], [185],
[186]
SOP
[187], [188] SRM
Internal Imperfect Multiple 7 Single Omni-
Directional
7 7 [189] SOP
[190] Constraint,
SOP
Internal 7 Multiple 7 Multiple Omni-
Directional
7 7 [102],
[100], [101]
Constraint,
Minimum
Secrecy Rate
[139] SOP
Internal X Multiple X Single Omni-
Directional
7 7 [191] SOP
Internal Imperfect Multiple X Single Omni-
Directional
7 7 [192] SRM
Internal X Multiple X Multiple Omni-
Directional
7 7 [193],
[194], [195]
Constraint,
Maximum
Outage Secrecy
Rate
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optimizing simultaneously the source transmit power and the
jammer signal over the OFDM sub-carriers.
The authors in [158] used artificial noise at the transmitter,
by splitting the transmission power into two parts: one for
information transmission and one for noise emission. A key
pre-distribution scheme is assumed between the transmitter
and the receiver, in a way that the noise could be canceled
out at the receiver but not at the transmitter.
The authors in [157] integrated SWIPT concepts within cel-
lular networks based on the Orthogonal Frequency Division
Multiplexing Access (OFDMA) modulation scheme. Specifi-
cally, assuming the secrecy rate as a constraint of the problem,
they provide two sub-optimal solutions for the maximization
of the harvested power, by efficiently allocating the power
on different sub-carriers. The authors in [160] derived the
SOP of two competing antenna-selection schemes, namely
the optimal antenna selection (OAS) scheme and suboptimal
antenna selection (SAS). They compared the performance of
these schemes against traditional transmission schemes via
simulations, verifying that OAS outperforms SAS when RF
constraints are considered. Differently from other contribu-
tions, the authors in [156] investigated also power optimization
problems on the transmission side. Specifically, they evaluated
the best power control policy on the transmitter, achieving
the secrecy rate maximization on the receiver. To this aim,
they derive a relationship between the secrecy rate and the
SNR at the receiver, developing an algorithm that reduces at
minimum the complexity and the computational burden on the
transmitting device. Moreover, their evaluation shows that a
high transmission power does not guarantee, at the same time,
minimum secrecy rate and energy harvesting requirements.
An interesting contribution is provided also by the authors
in [166]. In this contribution, the authors proposed two re-
laying schemes based on power splitting and time-splitting
(namely, PSR and TSR), where the relays can tune the ratios
in a way to trade-off computational and harvesting processes.
Interestingly, they provide results showing that the channel
information at the eavesdroppers does not affect these metrics
(note that the usefulness of the CSI is not discussed in the
derivation of the maximum secrecy rate of the system). Finally,
they show that the PSR scheme outperforms the TSR when
secrecy capacity is considered.
It is worth also mentioning the work by the authors in [144],
where the adversary is a jammer, besides being characterized
by the standard eavesdropping capabilities.
The Imperfect CSI assumption is used in [171], still con-
sidering a single single-antenna eavesdropper scenario. The
authors assumed the secondary users to be energy-constrained
devices, requiring power from the primary users to operate
in the network. Given that these devices are constrained, the
authors assume that they do not have enough capabilities to
perform energy harvesting and data decoding at the same time;
thus, a TS architecture is assumed. In this context, the authors
designed a multi-objective optimization framework based on
a Pareto-optimal resource allocation algorithm, leveraging the
weighted Tchebycheff approach, where the maximization of
the secrecy rate is one of the objectives of the optimization.
Single Multi-Antenna Internal Eavesdropper. A single
internal eavesdropper equipped with multiple antennas is con-
sidered by the authors in [172]— [174].
The contribution by the authors in [173] is particularly inter-
esting from the security perspective, given that they considered
not only information eavesdropping but also unauthorized
EH activities. This work considered the adversary as a two-
antenna active energy harvester, working according to the SR
logic, able to legitimately harvest energy via one antenna, and
illegitimately and actively eavesdropping the signal using the
second antenna. Therefore, during information transmission
activities, this node is a regular eavesdropper. At the same
time, during EH activities, it is interested in acquiring much
energy and recharging its battery more than expected, using
hardware circuitry that is more performant than the legitimate
devices. The authors formulated asymptotic expressions of the
lower bound on the ESR and the average harvested energy, and
they used these results to optimize the system design, reducing
the power and information leakage based on several system
parameters. They also demonstrated the existence of a trade-
off between the worst-case ESR and the worst-case average
for the harvested energy. It is worth also mentioning the
recent work in [174], where the authors experimentally verified
their findings through a real proof-of-concept, using off-the-
shelf Software Defined Radios and backscatter systems. Note
that this is the only work on physical-layer data secrecy that
provides experimental tests and verification of the theoretical
findings. No knowledge about the eavesdropper’s channel
conditions is also assumed in the work by the authors in [176],
where a Nakagami-m channel model is assumed. The context
assumed by this work is very specific, as it considers a SIMO
RF network integrating SWIPT concepts mixed with a free-
space optical communication link. The authors considered
a single energy harvesting receiver, potentially behaving as
an eavesdropper, and they investigated the average secrecy
capacity and the lower bound of the SOP taking into account
different physical-layer parameters, such as the architecture of
the receiver and the deployment of multiple antennas.
Multiple Single-Antenna Internal Eavesdroppers. Multi-
ple non-colluding eavesdroppers equipped with single omni-
directional antennas are considered as adversaries in [177]—
[188]. Specifically, the authors in [177] have been the first
to integrate EH concepts in the context of cellular networks.
Here, the Cellular Network Base Stations are assumed as
the transmitters, and the authors investigated the secrecy
capacity of the link assuming the receivers are equipped with
EH modules (considering an SR hardware architecture). The
authors formulated the optimization problem to minimize the
overall transmit power of the system, while taking the link
secrecy rate as a constraint of the optimization problem, and
they used the Semi-Definite Relaxation tool to find a convex
form of the problem.
The authors in [184] proposed a protocol to enhance the
secrecy rate of a WPCN, thanks to the deployment of a
power beacon. First, the power beacon transmits RF energy
to charge a node. Then, it protects the transmission of this
device by emitting friendly jamming, thus degrading the SNR
at the eavesdroppers. They studied the problem using finite-
state Markov Chains, deriving the expressions of the SOP and
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secrecy rate in this scenario, evaluating also the reliability and
security of the communication link.
In the context of overlay CRNs, the authors in [185] proposed
and evaluated a dedicated scheme, namely EARTH, where
the residual harvested energy is assumed as a constraint of
an optimization problem. Assuming as a metric the trade-
off between secrecy rate and outage probability, they derived
the SOP of the system and compared its performance against
standard scheduling methods, such as round-robin, showing
superior performance. Assuming a MISO scenario, the authors
in [188] considered the maximization of the sum logarithmic
secrecy rates, by considering energy harvesting constraints.
To achieve the objective, they use specific optimization tools,
such as the Software Defined Radio (SDR) and the successive
convex centralized beamforming design. They demonstrated
that the transmission of single streams does not affect the
secrecy rate.
Imperfect knowledge of the adversarial CSI is assumed in the
works by the authors in [189] and [190]. In particular, the
authors in [189] provided a complete study on the performance
of EH-NOMA schemes in CRNs, by assuming a realistic non-
linear EH model. Also in this case, the physical-layer data
secrecy is enhanced thanks to the deployment of cooperative
jamming techniques. The authors used the SDR method to
derive closed-form expressions for the problem, and showed
that their proposed solution achieves better secrecy rate than
the conventional OFDM schemes.
Multiple Non-Colluding Multi-Antenna Internal Eaves-
droppers. Multiple non-colluding multi-antenna eavesdrop-
pers are considered in [100]— [102], and [139], all investigat-
ing the SEE problem. Besides introducing and formalizing the
SEE problem, the authors in [100] investigated a weighted-
sum secrecy rate maximization problem, considering at the
same time the secrecy rate of the communication link and the
total power consumption on the transmitter. They solved the
problem using an iterative algorithm based on the Dinkelbach
method [197], and they validated the effectiveness of such
a method via numerical analysis. In the context of overlay
CRNs, the authors in [139] proposed optimal relay selection
(ORS) strategies assuming both the time switching relay
(TSR) protocol and power splitting relay (PSR) protocol. They
derived exact closed-form expressions related to the SOP of
primary users and the ergodic rate of secondary users. An
important contribution by the authors is the derivation of the
SOP of the primary users assuming an infinite number of
eavesdroppers and high SNR on the adversarial side.
The authors in [192] considered multiple colluding single-
antenna eavesdroppers, where the maximum SINR receive
beamforming technique is used by the eavesdroppers to ag-
gregate information. The authors formulated the optimization
problem to maximize the secrecy rate of the main communica-
tion link, considering the total harvested power and the power
consumption as constraints of the optimization problem. They
found that despite the maximum secrecy rate is constrained by
the total harvested power constraint, only a little reduction in
the secrecy rate is achieved, especially when the information
about the CSI of the eavesdroppers is available.
Multiple Colluding Multi-Antenna Internal Eavesdrop-
pers. Multiple colluding multi-antenna eavesdroppers are
considered in [193]— [195], with either imperfect or full
CSI knowledge. In this context, while most of the schemes
considered a perfect or imperfect knowledge of the CSI at
the eavesdroppers, the authors in [194] considered a realistic
scenario, where the CSI of the eavesdroppers is not known
by the legitimate entities. Assuming multiple, multi-antenna,
possibly-colluding eavesdroppers, the authors formulated a
power minimization problem, assuming the maximum achiev-
able secrecy rate as a constraint of the problem. They also
found the maximum secrecy rate of the system, assuming as
constraints of the problem a maximum transmission power and
a minimum outage probability.
The authors in [191] investigated the multi-hop multipath
wireless network scenario, where all the nodes in the path
are energy-harvested devices. They proposed three different
protocols for the path selection from a source node to a
destination node, to minimize the SOP and maximize the
harvested energy, at the same time. Besides considering multi-
ple non-cooperative eavesdroppers, they also include hardware
impairments in the model, deriving expressions that closely
match real deployments.
Finally, we highlight that all of the above approaches consid-
ered neither directional antennas nor included considerations
regarding the physical distribution of the eavesdroppers in the
scenario. At the same time, in line with the results of our
analysis regarding external adversaries, mobile adversaries are
not considered.
F. Untrusted Relays
We already introduced in Section V-B and discussed in the
two previous subsections the deployment motivations and main
working strategies of trusted relay nodes. Especially in deep-
fading and highly distributed scenarios, dedicated relay nodes
provide a crucial service, by forwarding a (possibly amplified)
version of the signal from the source toward the destination.
However, relays can be characterized by malicious behav-
iors. Indeed, they could be either untrusted devices, deployed
by network operators other than the ones operating the EH
network, or they can be attacked by malicious adversaries.
In both scenarios, an attacker controlling the relay owns
a crucial network element, potentially disclosing a signifi-
cant part of the information. Especially when working with
physical-layer security measures only (as in the contributions
discussed hereby), no further protection measures can ensure
the confidentiality of the information. These are the main
reasons motivating many studies in RF EH networks, where
untrusted relays are considered. The most common model is a
honest-but-curious relay, still achieving its relaying tasks in the
networks, but trying also to stealthily access the information
exchanged between the source and the destination.
A classification of the scientific contributions assuming
untrusted relays in RF EH networks is provided in Table VII,
considering the features and capabilities of the untrusted
relay(s).
Single Untrusted Relays. A single untrusted relay equipped
with a single omni-directional antenna is assumed as the
adversarial model by the authors in [198]— [203].
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TABLE VII
QUALITATIVE COMPARISON AMONG APPROACHES INVESTIGATING PHY-LAYER DATA SECRECY IN EH NETWORKS ASSUMING UNTRUSTED RELAYS.
Adversary CSI
Availability
Adversarial
Distribution
Collusion Adversarial
Receiving
Antennas
Adversarial
Antenna
Type
Adversary
Mobility
Distance
Considera-
tions
Scheme Security
Treatment
Untrusted
Relay
X Single 7 Single Omni-
Directional
7 7 [198],
[199],
[200]
ESR and SOP
Definition
[201],
[202],
[203]
SOP and
Secrecy Rate
[204] SRM
Untrusted
Relay
Imperfect Single 7 Single Omni-
Directional
7 7 [205] Average
Secrecy Rate
Untrusted
Relay
X Multiple 7 Single Omni-
Directional
7 7 [206] SOP and
Secrecy Rate
[207] ESR
To protect the information from eavesdropping on the relay,
the authors in [198] described a destination-assisted jamming
strategy, where the destination coordinates with the source
to transmit a jamming signal in parallel with the reception
of the information signal transmitted by the source to the
relay. Besides providing benefits in terms of EH (the relay
is powered by the jamming signal), the destination-assisted
jamming also enhances the security of the information at
the relay. Indeed, the signal received at the relay is the
combination of the jamming and the information, not revealing
the main message to the relay. When the relay forwards the
original message to the destination, the final receiving node
can subtract the noise and recover the original information.
The authors evaluated the SOP and the ESR assuming the
usage of both the TS and the PS strategy at the relay, and
they concluded that extended benefits in terms of physical-
layer data secrecy are provided via the use of the PS strategy.
Similar advantages in terms of data secrecy can be provided
when the relay is closer to the destination than to the source.
Still assuming a single untrusted relay, the authors in [205]
recently studied the effect of an outdated CSI estimation on the
achievable outage performance and secrecy rate of a communi-
cation link leveraging an untrusted relay. Similarly to previous
work, this contribution involves the use of friendly jamming
strategies to hide the message from the relay. However, due
to the imperfection of the CSI estimate, this contribution also
studied the impact of an imperfect jamming cancellation on the
secrecy performance of the communication link. Specifically,
this work finds the expression and configuration of several
parameters, such as the jamming power ratio, power splitting
factor and time-splitting ratio that can optimize the secrecy
performance metrics, finding sub-optimal but realistic solu-
tions.
Despite the authors in [198] assumed the use of the DF strategy
on the relay, all the other works listed in Tab. VII assumed
a relay working according to the AF strategy. In general, this
latter technique is preferable from the security perspective, as
it does not allow the relay to decode the information while in
transit toward the destination.
Assuming destination-assisted jamming, the authors in [202]
derived the closed-form expression of the secrecy rate and the
SOP for a MIMO network, where a base station equipped with
multiple antennas transmits confidential information toward
multi-antenna receivers. They also showed that increasing the
SINR on the destination provides enhancement on the secrecy
rate, even if the secrecy rate approaches a constant value by
increasing the SINR.
Multiple Non-Colluding Untrusted Relays. Multiple non-
colluding untrusted relays equipped with a single receiving
antenna are considered only in the work by the authors in [206]
and [207]. For instance, the authors in [207] delegated the
jamming activities to a dedicated friendly jamming device,
emitting noise according to a time profile that is known (and
thus, cancellable) at the receiver.
G. Lessons Learned
The discussion and classification reported in the previous
subsections highlighted several take-away messages, summa-
rized in the following.
Security and Energy Trade-off. Security and energy are
often contrasting objectives. Indeed, when the maximum se-
crecy rate is required, more energy than the optimal is required
from the source, leading to a non-optimal energy efficient
configuration. At the same time, minimizing the power con-
sumption on the source or maximizing the harvesting ratio on
the receiver always leads to sub-optimal secrecy rate, as well
as secrecy outage effects. In this context, several approaches,
such as [100], [101], and [102], introduced hybrid security-
energy metrics, trading off between security and energy avail-
ability. Considering the overall scarce energy availability of
RF EH scenarios, configuring the network in a way to achieve
such a trade-off is crucial to guarantee, at the same time,
network lifetime, usability, and reliability constraints.
Channel State Information (CSI) Awareness. The avail-
ability of the CSI on the eavesdropper(s) side is crucial in
calibrating the optimality of the solution from the security
perspective. When the CSI of the eavesdropper-source link is
known, it is possible to maximize the secrecy capacity and to
select the beamforming vector and the jamming to minimize
the SNR on the adversary. Another common approach is to
consider data secrecy or secrecy capacity as a constraint of
the optimization problem, assuring that the secrecy rate does
not degrade over a minimum threshold or, equivalently, the
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secrecy outage probability does not exceed a specified upper
bound.
Physical-Layer Security and Data Secrecy issues in Non-
Orthogonal Multiple Access (NOMA) networks. During the
last few years, a significant amount of scientific contributions
have focused on physical-layer and data secrecy security issues
in EH networks working according to the Non-Orthogonal
Multiple Access (NOMA) paradigm. Compared to previous
technologies based on orthogonal multiple access, such as
OFDMA, NOMA schemes allow overcoming issues related
to the limited number of orthogonal resources available in
the spectrum and the limited number of users that can be
served, tolerating interferences and removing them on the
user’s side thanks to Successive Interference Cancellation
(SIC) techniques [208]. However, the application of such
advanced techniques generally introduce an increase in the
cost and complexity of the receivers, drastically impacting
the energy budget of such devices. Therefore, one of the key
challenges that have attracted the interest of Academia is the
trade-off between energy and security, guaranteeing that users
can harvest sufficient energy from the received signals, while
also guaranteeing minimum thresholds on the security-related
metrics, such as the secrecy rate. Other recent works such
as [118] have also brought UAVs into the play, improving the
SINR on the receivers and managing energy-security trade-offs
on the UAVs.
Relationship between SINR and location. The largest part
of the papers discussed in the previous subsections did not
specifically consider the physical deployment of the adver-
sary, i.e., its position to the main communication link. This
is because the distance eavesdropper-target is mimicked by
the SINR experienced at the eavesdropper. Without loss of
generality, the above contributions assumed a homogeneous
scenario, where high values of eavesdropping SINR corre-
spond to locations of the eavesdropper close to the target
communication link, while low values of SINR experienced by
the eavesdropper are consistent with a positioning far from the
main communication link. However, translating SINR values
to a real distance from the target has been not investigated in
the literature.
H. Future Directions
Despite the large body of scientific contributions available in
the literature, EH security issues still include some unexplored
research directions, listed below.
Multiple Colluding Directional Antennas. Few recent
works investigated the secrecy rate that can be achieved via
physical-layer security schemes when the adversaries use a
directional antenna (see [141] and [142]). However, to the
best of the authors’ knowledge, none of these contributions
considered the use of multiple directional antennas. Such a
scenario could be particularly interesting from the security per-
spective, especially when the adversary could take advantage
of different eavesdropping locations, such as when collusion
is considered. In this scenario, the adversary could effectively
reject or minimize the impact of the intentional interference
caused by other network elements, thus experiencing an SINR
very close to the one in the target destination location.
Antenna Identification Mechanisms. All the approaches
discussed in this section investigated physical-layer security
from the information-theoretic perspective, looking at the
security metrics discussed in Section V-A. However, given
that these strategies deal with RF signals, further security
aspects should be analyzed, such as the possibility to identify
single-antenna contributions to the final signal. For instance,
in the context of audio signals, the Independent Component
Analysis (ICA) method has been already demonstrated to be
a successful tool to identify and reconstruct the waveform
emitted by a single antenna [209], thanks to the deployment of
a network of colluding eavesdropping antennas. To the best of
the authors’ knowledge, these physical-layer security analyses
have not been provided in the literature.
UAVs and Mobile Adversary. Despite some recent work
assuming RF EH devices included mobile devices, such as
UAVs, the adversary (either single or multiple) is always
considered as a static network element, and only a single
work (e.g., [146]) assumed location diversity. We notice that a
mobile adversary could explore location diversity techniques
to boost its SINR, as well as it could get closer to the target
(mobile) adversary to improve its data decoding chances. In
addition, multiple adversarial UAVs can be even more capable
of decoding correctly the information delivered by the source,
as they could explore location diversity and correlate different
measurements. Without any doubt, further investigations are
needed to establish the robustness of current schemes against
mobile UAV-equipped adversaries.
Untrusted UAVs Relays. When UAVs are included in the
scenario, all the works surveyed in this contribution considered
trusted UAV relays, always cooperating with the intended
source and destination. However, UAVs can be also hijacked
by the adversary. Moreover, they could behave according to
the honest-but-curious paradigm, i.e., behaving as intended,
but trying to access the information delivered from the source.
While these scenarios could appear similar to the ones dis-
cussed in Section V-F, the inherent mobility features of the
UAVs can provide additional advantages to the adversary,
as highlighted in the previous point. Hence, there is a need
for further research in this challenging scenario, calling for
solutions able to mitigate the presence of single/multiple
untrusted UAVs relays.
Active Adversaries. The recent contribution by the authors
in [144] has been the first to consider an active adversary,
not only interesting in decoding the confidential information
but also in the disruption of the main communication link.
Indeed, a powerful adversary able to inject noise on the
communication channel, eventually using a directional antenna
pointed toward the target communication link, could decrease
the SINR experienced by the legitimate destination, leading to
an increased number of errors and increased guessing chances
by the adversary itself.
Determination of Relay Trust. The discussion in Sec-
tion V-F highlighted some directions to keep the information
confidential from untrusted relays, at the cost of a destination-
assisted or device-assisted jamming. However, the level of
trust of the relays in the network should be established at the
deployment or at the boot time, and not at run-time. This is
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crucial to avoid the unnecessary cost of friendly jamming in
terms of network and interference management or to reduce
network information exposure to a relay. Thus, dedicated
mechanisms and strategies to determine the level of trust of
a relay should be implemented. To the best of the authors’
knowledge, these considerations have not been addressed in
the contributions available in the literature.
Clustering and Energy Availability Issues in EH-NOMA
networks. One of the key challenges when designing secure
NOMA networks is the clustering logic. In this specific
context, clusters refer to groups of devices sharing the same
frequency-time resource, while the clustering refers to the
process of assigning resources to the clusters. We notice that
optimizing the clustering of the users might involve undesired
effects, such as the unwanted delivery of sufficient energy to
eavesdroppers, enabling them to decode information and let
the secrecy rate of the main communication links to fall below
the desired threshold. Based on the above considerations, this
is one of the key challenges to address when designing opti-
mized NOMA networks, especially for locations with medium-
to-low SNR. The solutions could leverage mobile devices,
such as UAVs, equipped with directional antennas, in a way
to minimize the leakage of the signal to undesired/insecure
locations.
Energy Harvesting - Rate-Splitting Multiple Access
(RSMA) schemes. While NOMA schemes rely on the full
decoding of the interference, Rate-Splitting Multiple Access
(RSMA) schemes take into account the potentially destructive
nature of the interference, and therefore, they treat the received
signal partially as noise and partially as intended constructive
interference, decoding it [210]. The usage of RSMA schemes
has been recently studied mainly in the context of cellular net-
works, in broadcast-channel single-cell scenarios [211], [212],
and interference-channel multi-cell setup [213].
Similar to the case of NOMA schemes, it is straightforward
to apply RF EH principles with networks operating according
to RSMA techniques. Indeed, hybrid access points could
broadcast dedicated energy signals in the downlink to cellular
and D2D users working according to the RF EH principles dis-
cussed in Sections II-D and II-E. Hybrid access points can fur-
ther gather the information transmitted by the users in the up-
link, relaying them to the base station. In this context, several
optimization problems can be formulated, in a way to reduce
the energy consumption, minimize the delay in information
reporting, or maximizing the throughput, eventually consider-
ing friendly jamming techniques and the imperfections/non-
idealities of real EH circuits [214], [215], [216].
RSMA schemes have a high potential to be used for security
applications. Indeed, RSMA schemes can split the user’s
message into a private part, decodable by only a specific user,
using a fraction of the overall available power, and a common
part, decodable by a given group of users, using the remaining
part of the available power [213]. However, at the time of
this writing, the literature does not provide any specific study
investigating classical security-related metrics in the context
of energy harvesting RSMA schemes, such as the secrecy
rate, the secrecy outage probability, and the secrecy capacity.
Note that this is a particularly challenging area, as the energy
consumption of EH users should not exceed the related EH
capabilities of the users. We expect this area to be particularly
promising in terms of research contributions, in the months to
come.
Performance in Real Deployment Scenarios. The recent
work by the authors in [174] has been the first to provide
an experimental evaluation of the analytical and simulation
findings in the RF EH physical-layer security area. Indeed,
providing experimental testbeds and open-source code could
help the research community to either validate and verify the
findings of a specific work, as well as to easily extend that
results in different scenarios. Moreover, the translation from
the simulation to the experimental validation could help to
refine the theoretical models and highlighting technical issues,
such as network synchronization and interference cancellation.
Furthermore, real experimental evaluations could help to trans-
late from security evaluations based on SINR at the eaves-
dropper to the definition of secure deployment areas, where
the minimum required secrecy rate is achieved. At this time,
despite the presence of a large number of theoretical results
validated by simulations, almost no experimental results or real
testbeds (excluding the one mentioned before) are available in
the literature.
VI. ADDITIONAL PHYSICAL-LAYER COUNTERMEASURES
Techniques focusing on physical-layer data secrecy and
lightweight cryptography schemes addressed only a limited
part of the attacks and threats described in Section III. The
current literature includes also additional countermeasures,
deployed on purpose to protect EH networks against specific
threats. These approaches, falling neither in techniques aimed
at protection data secrecy, nor in lightweight cryptography
schemes, have been discussed in this section, and cross-
compared along different common features.
A security-oriented overview of such scientific contributions
is provided in Table VIII.
The following discussion provides more details about the
schemes listed in Table VIII, introducing them based on the
target security service.
Many scientific contributions in the last years, such as
[62]— [67], provided physical-layer solutions to guarantee the
availability of an EH network. More in detail, to face malicious
jamming sources, the contributions in [62], [63], [64], [67]
recommended the use of well-known frequency hopping and
spreading spectrum techniques. Other contributions, such as
[62], [63], [64] convert the jamming signal power into useful
transmission power, used to charge the legitimate devices.
Following game theory concepts, they modeled the interaction
between a pair of legitimate nodes and a jammer as zero-
sum-game, and they found optimal solutions (i.e., equilibrium
conditions) that minimize the impact of the jammer and
maximize the harvesting energy on the legitimate devices.
In the context of Energy Harvested Cognitive Radio Network,
the authors in [65] considered the use of a deception tactic
to exhaust energy resources of the attackers, i.e., to send fake
transmission data to compromise the attackers’ capabilities, to
deplete their energy. This countermeasure allows the secondary
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TABLE VIII
OVERVIEW OF PHYSICAL-LAYER PROTECTION TECHNIQUES ADOPTED IN EH NETWORKS
Scheme Enabling
Technologies
Scenario Considered Threat Defense Tools Target Security
Service
Analysis Tool
[61] Generic WSN Flooding Attacks Throughput degradation
estimation, Intrusion
Detection Based, Path
Reassignment, Traffic
aggregation
Availability Markov Process
[62], [63] Generic Generic EH
Wireless
Network
Jamming Channel Hopping
(OFDM), Power
Spreading
Availability Game Theory
[64] Generic Generic EH
Wireless
Network
Jamming Time Splitting EH Availability Game Theory
[65] Cognitive Radio
Networks
Generic EH
Wireless
Network
Jamming Deception Tactic (fake
transmissions)
Availability Markov Process
[66] Generic Wireless
Communica-
tion Control
Systems
Jamming Optimal non-causal
Energy Allocation Policy
Availability Markov Process
[67] Interference
Alignment
Wireless
Network
Generic EH
Wireless
Network
Jamming Opportunistic Interference
Alignment
Availability MinIL Algorithm
[72] Generic IoT, WSN DoS (network level),
Stealthy Collision
Attacks
Adaptative
Acknowledgement
Approach (AAA)
Availability Markov Process
[70], [71] Generic Generic EH
Wireless
Network
Energy DoS Power Positive
Networking (PPN)
Availability Resurrection
Duckling Based
[22] WPCN Generic EH
Wireless
Network
Jamming, Spoofing,
Monitoring, Charging
Attacks, Malicious
Applications
FDMA, TDMA,
frequency hopping,
Interference Alignment;
Digital Signatures; Data
and Energy exchanging
estimation
Availability,
Confidentiality
Experimental
[68] ABCN IoT Jamming,
Deauthentication,
Replay, Channel
Spoofing
Ambient Backscattering,
Multi-path Propagation
Signatures
Availability,
Authenticity
One-Class SVM
[74] Generic Generic EH
Wireless
Network
Power and Timing
Side Channels
Quantization Controllers Confidentiality Implementation
Optimization
[75], [77] ABCN Mobile
Devices,
WBAN
Side Channels,
Authenticity
Shielding, Software
Layer Solutions,
Backscatter Signal
Authentication with
Propagation Signatures
Confidentiality,
Authenticity
Physical-Layer
Analysis
[76] Generic Intermittent
Computing
Systems
Power Interruption
Attacks
Secure Checkpoints Confidentiality,
Integrity,
Authenticity,
Availability
Input/Output
users in a cognitive radio network to deal with jamming
attacks, reducing the impact of the attack. The authors in [66]
proposed a solution against jamming attacks in closed-loop
systems, by working on the solution of the optimization energy
allocation problem. An optimal non-causal energy allocation
policy allows the system to estimate the state of the control
process (leveraging a Kalman Filter) while ensuring avail-
ability and stability. Similarly, the authors in [67] considered
interference alignment methods (i.e., beamforming strategies)
to mitigate adversarial jammers. The anti-jamming solution
has the main goal of creating an Interference Alignment
network comprising some of the legitimate devices (e.g., the
transmitter and the EH nodes), while the remaining nodes are
dedicated to EH tasks. Both the interference signal and the
jamming signal are considered as the sources of RF EH on
the compatible devices.
A protection scheme to guarantee network availability under
flooding attacks in the WSN scenario has been proposed by
the authors in [61]. Specifically, they used EH concepts and
Markov Process theory to identify ongoing flooding attacks.
They modeled the traffic state of the network via a Markov
process, and they provide an estimation of the sensor node
throughput degradation under flooding attacks, comparing it
to a threshold. The higher the degradation, the higher the
probability of ongoing flooding attacks.
To face DoS attacks, the authors in [72] conceived a frame-
work to identify stealthy and malicious nodes that transmit
packets for intentional packet drop in a EH network. They
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exploited the Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) feature and an
Adaptive Acknowledgment Approach (AAA) to identify these
stealthy collision attacks. In the AAA strategy, each node
sends a data packet, monitors the next transmission of its first
hop downstream node and waits for the acknowledgment from
the second hop downstream node. If the acknowledgment is
not received in the timing window, there is a high probability
of an attack.
The authors in [70] and [71] provided methods to mitigate DoS
attacks, by offloading the power requirements of the EH node
to the device that is sending networking requests. Specifically,
they designed an alternative channel, namely Power-Positive-
Networking (PPN), where each received signal allows to
recharge the battery of the device. Being very similar to the
underlying concept of SWIPT networks (see Section II-E),
these alternative channels stop energy DoS attacks, given that
any jamming signal aimed at interrupting wireless charging
results in a re-charge of the EH device.
The authors in [22] highlighted qualitatively some possible
countermeasures that could be used in WPCN against various
types of attacks. To face jamming attacks, the authors proposed
to leverage traditional modulation schemes, such as Frequency
Division Multiple Access (FDMA), Time Division Multiple
Access (TDMA), and frequency hopping, or to use interfer-
ence alignment principles (beamforming). To thwart spoofing
attacks, they indicated the possible use of digital signatures, to
provide authenticity and integrity of the messages. To detect
monitoring attacks, they proposed to listen to the communi-
cation channel and discover the presence of data exchanged
between the energy harvester nodes and possible malicious
nodes. Concerning charging attacks, the authors proposed to
perform frequent estimations of the energy that nodes are
harvesting in the network, and to detect anomalies in the
charging profile. Finally, to defeat malicious applications, the
authors proposed to verify the application signatures and to
check if they are trusted/valid. Alternatively, they indicated
the possibility to design energy-aware mechanisms, such that
every application could leverage an energy budget to be used
for computations and transmissions. Finally, to address the
privacy issues discussed in Section III, they proposed to collect
the RF fingerprints from the environment, and to compare
them with the ones acquired at run-time.
In the context of the IoT networks powered via ambient
backscatter, the authors in [68] identified the possibility to
enforce the authenticity of the communication via multi-
path propagation signatures, thus securing pairing and data
communication processes. They found that the interaction of
the RF source with the environment and the location of the
specific device is unique. Thus, it can be used to provide a
probabilistic and ambient-dependent authentication, as well
as a tool to identify replay and de-authentication deadlock
attacks.
Other approaches investigated solutions to avoid side-channel
attacks. For instance, the authors in [74] investigated the
hardware design of a system adopting quantization controllers,
using the harvested energy to carry out a secure computation
in an isolated environment.
In the ABCN scenario, the authors in [75] proposed two
strategies, i.e.: (i) to block the incident/reflected signal; and (ii)
to adopt software solutions (e.g. set permissions on a device
file, stop the network manager, hiding the WiFi interface).
The usage of propagation signatures to identify the attacker
has been also proposed and discussed by the authors in [77].
Finally, to face power interruption attacks at the physical
layer, the authors in [76] proposed a secure protocol for
devices with intermittent connectivity, characterized by several
security features. The protocol uses random nonces to protect
against checkpoint replays attacks, leverages a pre-shared key
to avoid sensitive data leakage, exploits hash chains to ensure
data integrity, preserves the correct order of the operations by
ensuring the consecution between the checkpoints, and, finally,
improves the resilience of the device towards power loss issues
by storing redundant copies of the system state.
A. Lessons Learned
The non-cryptographic protection strategies and tools dis-
cussed in the previous section highlighted several take-home
messages and guidelines to be considered when deploying EH
technologies. The key considerations are summarized below.
Protecting the Availability of EH Networks. Most of
the solutions previously discussed focused on improving the
resilience of the network against attacks targeting its availabil-
ity. Indeed, differently from traditional IoT networks, energy
provisioning in EH networks is often intermittent, and thus
denying its availability could be the easiest way to disrupt
network operation. While traditional means such as solar,
wind, and mechanical sources are easiest to be disrupted,
stopping RF harvesting is not easy. Hence, jamming the source
only increases the amount of RF energy available, resulting in
an increased amount of power available at the devices. This
is the reason motivating the even more diffused consideration
of the RF source as a secure harvesting method.
Side-Channel Attacks in EH Networks. Traditional EH
sources, as well as RF harvesting solutions, have not been de-
signed with physical security in mind. Therefore, well-known
side-channel attacks are even more powerful and easy-to-
perform than in traditional wireless networks. Due to the hard
integration of classical hardware approaches, countermeasures
available in the literature use physical-layer techniques (such
as the identification of propagation signatures), whose security
is probabilistic and not fully tested.
B. Future Directions
Few future research directions concerning lightweight non-
cryptographic countermeasures for EH networks can be iden-
tified.
Experimental energy expenditure evaluations. Despite
being effective, none of the above-described protection tech-
nologies provided an evaluation of the related energy con-
sumption. This is a crucial aspect, because of the energy-
security trade-off vastly described in this paper. Currently,
it is still not clear if traffic analysis and physical-layer se-
curity techniques are effectively less energy-consuming than
traditional cryptography approaches, especially considering
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the optimizations of cryptography techniques described in
Section IV.
Detecting Physical Presence in EH Networks. As de-
scribed in the previous subsection, a side-channel attack is
still one of the most challenging threats in EH networks. It
is worth noticing that side-channel attacks require physical
adversaries, able to approach the target devices and deploy
dedicated tools. Hence, to prevent such an attack, a solution
to detect the presence of a physical intruder could be cou-
pled with the deployment of EH networks, providing viable
protection schemes. For instance, considering the sensitivity
of RF EH technologies to modifications of the surrounding
environment, physical adversaries can be identified, triggering
appropriate response strategies. At the same time, further
research directions could evaluate the feasibility of running
such systems on the EH device or dedicated battery-supplied
nodes.
VII. EMERGING RESEARCH CHALLENGES
The previous sections highlighted the most prominent re-
search areas involving EH devices and networks, as well as
some future directions that can be pursued in the related
macro-areas. Besides these promising study areas, there are a
few other security application domains involving EH principles
and devices that, over the last years, have received little (if
any) attention from the scientific community. Some of them
are described below, along with key challenges to be solved
to finally unlock their potentials.
Intelligent Surfaces. Intelligent surfaces have recently
gained momentum, as one of the most appealing new at-
tractive technologies in the wireless communications research
domain [217]. In the literature we often found an inter-
changeable use of the terms Large Intelligent Surfaces (LIS)
and Intelligent Reconfigurable Surfaces (IRS). Overall, LIS
mainly refer to Active LIS-based Massive MIMO, as discussed
in [218]. They are used for data transmission (while IRS are
used for reflection), and they consist of massive antenna arrays,
organized on surfaces, and characterized by a fixed transmit
power per volume-unit constraint. At this time, they are mainly
considered for indoor applications, where they are shown to
be particularly successful for interference cancellation [219].
Without loss of generality, an IRS can be defined as a
bidimensional planar surface, consisting of a large number
of cheap and passive electromagnetic elements, structured
in arrays. The phase shift of the reflecting elements in the
array can be controlled independently via software, without
requiring a dedicated energy source, in a way to reflect
the incident signal with specific desired properties, such as
attenuation and scattering [220]. Therefore, any software-
controlled change in the coefficients of the IRS contributes to
shape the incident signal with specific amplitude and phase,
modifying the wireless propagation environment and boosting
the reception of the signal towards specific locations [221].
Compared to existing solutions, such as ABCNs, Amplify-and-
Forward schemes, and LISs, IRSs offer real-time flexibility
and tuning of the coefficients, without requiring any additional
energy budget or additional information to be delivered on the
wireless channel [222].
From the security perspective, intelligent surfaces have already
started to attract the interest of many researchers, especially
the ones working on physical-layer security and data secrecy
schemes, as thoroughly discussed in Section V. While LIS
have been mainly investigated from the performance perspec-
tive, many very recent contributions have focused on the secu-
rity properties offered by IRS. Indeed, using IRSs it is possible
to precisely control the phase, the amplitude, the frequency,
and the polarization of the signals, including neither complex
encoding/decoding schemes, nor energy-consuming process-
ing operations. The usage of IRSs is particularly appealing
when the potential eavesdroppers are closer to the source
than the destination, or when the adversaries lie in the same
direction of the intended destination of the message [220].
In addition, the number of reflecting elements, as well as
the specific phase shift adopted by the reflecting elements,
and the IRS’s reflect beamforming, can be all combined and
optimized to restrict the received beams to specific locations,
to cancel beams at the location of the eavesdroppers, to reduce
the energy consumption on the transmitter, or to maximize the
SINR at the intended receivers [223].
Therefore, research groups working on physical-layer security
have already started to consider schemes that can optimize one
or more metric, by taking into account the remaining system
or security-related metrics as constraints of the optimization
problems. In this direction, we can notice that the literature
already includes some works that apply the findings and results
discussed in Section V to the new scenario, considering the
configuration of the coefficient of the IRS as new parameters
of the optimization problems.
For instance, the authors in [224], [225], [226], [227] have al-
ready provided preliminary studies considering single external
eavesdroppers, equipped with single receiving antennas. Inter-
nal adversaries, in the context of Cognitive Radio Networks
(CRN), have been already considered by the authors in [222].
Single eavesdroppers equipped with multiple antennas have
been considered in [228], while other very recent contributions
considered non-colluding multiple eavesdroppers, equipped
with either single [229] or multiple antennas [230], [231].
Other recent works, such as [232] are also evaluating the
benefits of Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques to boost
the secrecy rate towards multiple eavesdroppers. Similarly to
the studies discussed in Section V, we also notice different
formulations of the problem, based on the availability (or
not) of the CSI [233]. In line with the previous discussion,
the objectives pursued by the proposed optimization problems
are very similar to the ones discussed in Section V, such
as the Secrecy Rate Maximization [234] and the definition
of the secrecy capacity and outage probability [224], while
other works consider the secrecy rate as a constraint of the
optimization problem [235]. Recent works are also considering
the joint effect of friendly jamming, as a way to further
improve the secrecy of the main communication links against
external adversaries [236], [237].
Overall, following the current trend, we expect that a sig-
nificant number of scientific contributions will appear in the
upcoming months in the IRS area. Indeed, all the studies and
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findings consolidated in the last years in the context of data
secrecy in EH networks can be revisited in the emerging IRS
context, taking into account also the new degree of freedom
offered by the coefficients of the IRS and their energy effi-
ciency, paving the way for new appealing research challenges.
For instance, to the best of our knowledge, none of the
contributions in the current literature considered the chances
of multiple colluding eavesdroppers to reduce the secrecy rate
of networks using IRS, as well as none of them included con-
siderations on the particular directivity of the antennas used by
the legitimate devices and the eavesdroppers. In addition, new
security challenges emerge: an attacker can take the control of
the IRS, and modify at will the pattern of the incident signals
(e.g., directing the beam towards unintended locations, at the
advantage of the attacker); moreover, an attacker can also
locate the IRS and get physically closer, improving its SINR.
We expect also that the introduction of IRS will move data
secrecy and physical-layer security issues to new application
domains, such as vehicular networks, Flying-Ad-hoc Networks
(FANET), and Ultra-Dense Networks (UDN).
Physical-Layer Authentication using EH Signals. Some
recent contributions, such as [238], [77], and [239], inves-
tigated physical-layer authentication schemes leveraging EH
properties and devices. However, the authors in [238] and [77]
used physical-layer features, i.e., the frequency offset and the
on-body backscattering reflections related to wave propaga-
tions, respectively, and contextualized their usage when EH
devices are involved, thus not fully exploring EH features.
Instead, the authors in [239] were the first and only to use
properties specific to EH phenomena, i.e., the profile of the
energy harvested by a human during his regular gait. Using the
EH profile over time derived by EH processes, they created
a gait-based authentication protocol that does not require the
continuous sample of the accelerometer, drastically reducing
the overall energy consumption (up to 84%). In this context,
the authors reported slightly lower performance than typical
gait-based authentication schemes (89% in harsh conditions)
and significant success performance in spoofing attacks (up
to 14.1 %). Thus, further enhancements are possible, e.g.,
by coupling the gait with the movements of other parts
of the human body (e.g., hands and wrists). Besides, the
methodology could be even re-used in other contexts, such
as the authentication of embedded devices in industrial plants,
that can be characterized by distinctive features.
Overall, we can notice that despite physical-layer authen-
tication schemes have been investigated in the context of
RFID (see, for instance, [240]) and traditional backscattering
systems (e.g., the works in [241] and [242]), the usage of
EH properties for devices’ authentication still lacks complete
studies. For instance, studies about the unique charging profile
of EH devices or the presence of any imperfection in the
EH transfer are still not available in the literature, and can
pave the way to a completely new wave of physical-layer
authentication protocols, possibly overcoming the limitations
of current schemes.
Integrated Space and Terrestrial Networks (ISTN). In
their intended design, 5G wireless systems are mainly terres-
trial networks, and therefore their coverage area is limited. 6G
systems are expected to bring Low-Earth-Orbit (LEO) satel-
lites into the system architecture, to provide worldwide broad-
band connectivity, including users in open sea and remote
areas [243], [244]. Despite LEO satellites are the most feasible
to accomplish this task, due to the reduced distance from the
Earth and the consequently reduced latency, the prevalence
of the Line of Sight (LOS) component creates co-channel
interference effects, and in turn, signal degradation effects.
From the security perspective, LEO satellites are far from the
ground, and very difficult to be hijacked physically. However,
due to their distance, they can hardly be modified ex-post
in their hardware features, or augmented with new enabling
technologies. Therefore, their security properties should be
carefully verified and tested before deployment. In this context,
harvesting technologies can play a dual role. On the one
hand, solar cells integrated into satellites can boost the energy
available on the satellites, and increase the power available
for transmission and relay operations. On the other hand,
physical-layer information-theoretic security techniques can be
combined with dedicated harvesting technologies leveraging
Free Space Optical (FSO) communication links to further
enhance the security of the communication links and, at the
same time, increase the energy available at the receivers [245].
Physical Unclonable Functions using EH Principles.
In line with previous considerations on authentication using
EH principles, recently the authors in [246] described how
to use the dispersion of the power generation time of the
solar cells to identify the specific semiconductor, and thus
the device using the generated power. The usage of similar
principles in other harvesting technologies, such as RF, still
has not been investigated in the literature, and can provide anti-
counterfeiting strategies, hardware random number generation
tools, and auxiliary authentication solutions for EH devices.
Key Agreement Schemes using EH Properties. Despite
a large number of scientific contributions investigated innova-
tive and lightweight key agreement schemes using physical-
layer security mechanisms (see [247] for an overview), key
establishment mechanisms in EH networks have received only
minimal attention. A pioneering contribution in the context of
ABCN is the one described in [248], where the authors got
rid of the secret reconciliation procedure typical of physical-
layer key agreement schemes, improving the efficiency of
such schemes. However, the usage of physical-layer features
specific to energy harvesting, such as the ratio of harvested
energy over time and its relationship with unique devices’
features for key agreement, still has not received enough
attention by the scientific community.
Privacy Considerations. EH devices, especially IoT de-
vices using EH capabilities, could be subject to potential
privacy breaches, derived by the analysis of the energy con-
sumption and re-charging patterns, as well as their positioning
toward the source. Few recent scientific contributions, such
as the ones by the authors in [249] and [250], highlighted
these privacy issues in electricity and healthcare scenarios,
respectively. At the same time, the authors in [251] identified
the potential of RF harvesting properties for enhancing the
privacy level of smart meters, as they can differentiate energy
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sources and decorrelate the final consumed energy from the
profile of the energy expected from the legitimate source, thus
defending against side-channel attacks. The challenge here is
to come up with privacy-preserving frameworks, that can mask
the re-charging profiles and the energy expenditure behavior,
while minimally affecting the system availability (i.e., being
characterized by reduced energy consumption).
Secure Protocol Stack for EH Devices. The unique sys-
temic features of EH devices and networks, highlighted in the
previous sections, require the design of dedicated solutions
at all the layers of the protocol stack. Besides the significant
work on physical layer security described in previous sections,
several contributions investigating MAC protocols tailored
for EH devices have been classified and described by the
authors in [43]. At the same time, few contributions such
as [252] and [253] investigated secure routing protocols for
EH networks, mainly concentrating on reducing the energy
footprint of such schemes. Especially when the EH network is
targeted by attacks disrupting its availability, dedicated routing
protocols are required, that can rebalance the network traffic
towards nodes with high energy-budget, thus improving its
overall throughput.
Using Energy Harvesting for Security-Related Applica-
tions. Finally, only a few contributions are describing com-
mercial products using EH principles to enhance the physical
security of devices and people. For instance, the authors
in [254] recently presented the implementation of a physical
access control system based on energy harvesting, regulat-
ing the access of people to rooms in a building. However,
several additional applications are possible, not only limited
to the smart home application scenario, but also extending
to industrial control systems, entertainment, and intelligent
transportation (e.g. autonomous vehicles, UAVs), to name a
few.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we survey the prominent security issues,
mechanisms, techniques, and applications related to Energy
Harvesting for wireless networks. In particular, we first pro-
vide background information on models and technologies
necessary to delve into the EH field. Later, we address the
security domain. In detail, after a discussion of the possible
attacks, we have partaken the security domain for EH wireless
networks into three main macro-areas, i.e.: data secrecy at
the physical layer; lightweight cryptography techniques; and,
additional physical-layer countermeasures. Within these areas,
we classified the available scientific contributions along some
common features, such as the assumed adversarial model and
the target security service, we discussed common approaches
and distinguishing strategies, and we identified future promis-
ing research directions. Furthermore, we have highlighted
appealing research problems related to EH networks, such as
Intelligent Reconfigurable Surfaces (IRS) and physical-layer
security issues in Rate-Splitting Multiple Access schemes. We
believe that the exposed challenges show that the development
of security techniques for EH networks is still an exciting
research area, and that it can be inspiring for researchers,
industry, and start-ups, striving for innovative, non-invasive,
and computationally lightweight means to enforce systems
security in constrained energy-limited environments.
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